ANNEXATION OF NEW BUETHENS TO LAND. 87 



is it inconsistent with the right. So if instead of the direct path from 

 A to B, another track over the plaintiff's land from A to C, and thence 

 to B, had been substituted by a parol agreement of the parties, for an 

 indefinite time, yet the user of this substituted line may be considered 

 as substantially an exercise of the old right, and evidence of the con- 

 tinued enjoyment of it." {Payne v. Sheddcn.) And a parol agreement 

 for the substitution of a new way for an old prescriptive way, and a 

 consequent discontinuance to use the old way, afford no evidence of an 

 ahandonmmt thereof (Lovell v. Smith). But an obstruction, in its 

 nature permanent, which injures a right of way, if acquiesced in for 20 

 years, becomes evidence of a renunciation and abandonment of the right 

 of way. That is the ground upon which a reversioner is allowed to 

 bring his action for an obstruction apparently permanent, to lights and 

 other easements, which belong to the premises (Bower v. Eill) ; and see 

 Jesse V. Gifford; and Littkdale J.'s judgment in Moore v. Eawson, on 

 the material difference between the mode of acquiring a right of common 

 or of way, and a right to light or air ; the latter of which is acquired 

 by mere occupancy, and the former only by user accompanied with con- 

 sent of the owner of the land (8 B. & C. 339). 



It is not in the power of a vendor to create any rights not connected 

 with the use or enjoyment of the land, and annex them to it ; nor can 

 the owner of land render it subject to a new species of burthen so as to 

 bind it in the hands of an assignee. Cresswell J. said, " This principle 

 is sufiicient to dispose of the present case. It would be a novel incident 

 annexed to land that the owner and occupier should, for purposes 

 wholly unconnected with that land, and merely because he is owner 

 and occupier, have a right of road over other land. And it seems to 

 us that a grant of such privilege or easement can no more be annexed, 

 so as to pass with the land, than a covenant for any collateral matter " 

 (Smitli V. Aclcroyd) ; and per Lord Brougliam C. in Kcippd v. Bayley : 

 " The covenant (that is such as will run with the land) must be of such 

 a nature as 'to inhere in the kmd,' to use the language of some cases ; 

 or ' it must concern the demised premises, and the mode of occupying 

 them,' as it is laid down in others : ' it must be qiwdammodo annexed 

 and appurtenant to them,' as one authority has it ; or as another says, 

 * it must both concern the thing demised, and tend to support it, and 

 support the reversioner's estate.' Incidents of a novel kind cannot be 

 devised and attached to property, at the fancy or caprice of any owner." 



" A ivay of necessity is when there be but one road to a place, and 

 no other way of going " (Willes, 71) ; and in Shury v. Piyott, a way to 

 church or market is classed under this head. And per Parlie B. : " If 

 a way granted by a lease cannot be used, by reason of its passing over 



