DEDICATION OF A WAY TO THE PUBLIC. 91 



There may be a dedicalioii of a ivay to tlie public, for a limilcd 2ni.rpose, 

 as for a foot-way, horse-way, or drift-way ; but there cannot be a dedi- 

 cation to a limited j^art of the public, as to a parish. Such a partial 

 dedication is simply void, and will not operate in law as a dedication to 

 the whole public (Foote v. IlicsJcissoi, 11 M. & W. 827). And per 

 ParJce B. : " In order to constitute a \a\\d dedication to the puljlic of a 

 highway, there must be an animus dedicandi, of which the user by the 

 public is evidence and no more : and a single act of interruption by the 

 ownei- is of much more weight upon a question of intention than many 

 acts of enjoyment." It was decided on the authority of this case in 

 Reg. V. Inhabitants of East MarTc, that public user of a road for 50 years 

 is evidence from which a jury may infer a dedication, thougli it may not 

 be clear in whom the ownership of the soil is invested. In Rex v. Petrie, 

 which the Court of Queen's Bench could not distinguish from the above, 

 it was also held that public user of a road for some time is sufficient ^^rma 

 facie evidence of a dedication to the public by an owner of the freehold, 

 and it is not necessary to show by whom the dedication was made. And 

 per Baijleij J. in Harper v. Chartesworth, where a public footway over 

 crown land was extinguished by an inclosure act, but for 20 years after 

 the inclosure took place the public continued to use the way, this user 

 was not evidence of a dedication to the public, as it did not appear to 

 have been with the knowledge of the Crown, who had the riglit of soil. 

 Wood V. Veat is an express autliority to show that the consent of the 

 lessee is not sufficient for that purpose, because it cannot bind the owner 

 of the inheritance. It was there held that the owner of the fee when 

 the lease expired had a right to prevent the public fi'om going along 

 the road, notwithstanding it had been used by the public during the 

 term. In Harper v. Charlesivorth, moreover, there was not sufficient 

 evidence to warrant the conclusion that the road was used with the 

 consent of any person in the occupation of the land (4 B, & C. 57-4). 



A right of ivay for agricultural purposes is a limited and qualified 

 right of way, and does not necessarily confer a right to use such way 

 for general and universal purposes. Therefore it does not follow that 

 because the defendant proves a right to carry corn and manure over the 

 locus in quo, he has a general and unlimited right to carry lime, or the 

 produce of a quarry over it at all times and for all purposes : per Wood, 

 B. {JacJcson v. Staccy). Proof of " a free right of way on foot, and for 

 horses, oxen, cattle, and sheep,'' does not confer a right to lead and carry 

 away manure, for leading implies drawing in a carriage, and the plain- 

 tifPs themselves admitted that they had no right to "lead" in that sense 

 (Brunton v. Hall). The disturbance complained of in this action, was 

 that a person wheeling manure in a wheelbarrow from the plaintiffs' 



