9-i OBSTRUCTION OF FOOTWAY. 



an occupation Avay (BroiruJoir v. Tomlinsoii). A person "who prescribes 

 ill a que estate for a private ^Yay cannot justify going ont of it on the 

 ailjoining land, because tlie way is impassable {Bullard v. Harrison). 

 2\tyhr v. Whiichead has settled the distinction, that the right of going 

 on the adjoining land under such circumstances does not extend to 

 private as well as public ways. However, the grantor of a private way 

 may be bound, either by express stipulation or prescription, to repair it. 

 But in an action upon the case against him for neglecting to do so, it is 

 sufBcient to allege generally in the declaration, that he, hy rcasoti of Ms 

 posses.-<ioii of the close in which the way is, oiff/hf to repair it ; and the 

 special matter of the obligation shall be given in evidence on the 

 general issue (Pomfref v. Rkrofi). WJiere flicre was a j^i'l'Hc foolway 

 from one field of the plaintiff's to another, and the defendant obstructed 

 the way by constructing or keeping a reservoir of water on it, whereby 

 the plaintiff and his servants employed in the management of his lands 

 and tending his cattle were obliged to go by a longer route, and their 

 work and labour were necessarily consumed to a greater extent, and the 

 plaintiff was prevented from employing them during such excess as he 

 otherwise would have done, it was held that this was sufficient allegation 

 of peculiar damage to support an action {Blagrave v, Bristol Watcrwm'lcs 

 Company). But it is no ground of action that a person by stopping up 

 on his own land the continuation of a public footway over his neigh- 

 bour's land causes the public to trespass on other parts of his neighbour's 

 land, to his damage, forming a beaten track and wearing off" in a perma- 

 nent manner the grass and herbage from such beaten track (/&.). A 

 man may not plough up a public footpath across his field (2 Rolle Abr. 

 Nusans \) PI.) ; and he must not erect a gate across such footpath (Sir 

 AV. Jones, R. 221). It has also been ruled by Parle J. in Baieman v. 

 Burge, where the plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining lands, and 

 the way had always been a public footway, with a stone wall two feet 

 high across it, that the defendant had no right to remove the stile, and 

 put up a high five-bar gate with a step in its place. " If there had 

 been 20 gates," said his lordship, " across the footway in other places 

 before it, that will not justify you in putting up this one to give people 

 the trouble of getting over it." 



A reversioner cannot maintain an action on the case against a stranger 

 Jor merely entering upon his land held by a tenant on lease, though the 

 entry be made in exercise of an alleged right of way, such an act during 

 the tenancy not being necessarily injurious to the reversion {Baxter v. 

 Tayl(/r). Parhe J. said : " My notion is that there must be some 

 destruction of the land to enable the reversioner to maintain this action. 

 No case has ever gone so far as to constitute a simple trespass, like 



