IGO EVIDENCE OF SCIENTER. 



accident occurred, the defendant said to one of the witnesses that he 

 knew a bull would run at anything red, and to another he knew Uw bull 

 would. The bull had often run at people in red garments, but it was 

 not shown that the defendant knew of these occurrences. FuUock C.B. 

 considered that if there was any evidence of a scienter the case could not 

 be withdrawn irom the jury, who found a verdict of £20 for the plaintiff. 

 The Court discharged a rule to enter a nonsuit, and thought the verdict 

 a temperate one. Parke B., in delivering judgment, said, "As the cir- 

 cumstance of persons carrying red handkerchiefs is not uncommon, and 

 it is reasonable to expect that in every public street persons so dressed 

 may not unfrequently be met with, we think it was the duty of tlie de- 

 fendant not to suffer such an animal to be driven in the public streets, 

 possessing, as he did, the knowledge that, if it met a person -^ith a red 

 gaiTOent, it was likely to run at and injure him. If there be any evidence 

 of a scienter it could not be withdrawn from the jury" (20 L. J. Ex. G97). 



The point in Judge v. Cox was whether a caution from the defemlant to 

 the person bitten was sufficient proof that the dog had bitten some one 

 before to the defendant's knowledge. The dog which, as the declaration 

 alleged, the defendant, Mrs. Cox, " knew to be accustomed to bite man- 

 kind," was on the premises when she took a ready-furnished house at 

 Harrow, and one of the witnesses stated that slie had warned him to 

 take care lest he should be bitten. It wrenched the staple from the 

 tree to which it was tied, and bit the plaintiff and a child subsequently ; 

 but there was no evidence of anterior biting. Allot J. intimated that 

 but for the warning given by the defendant he would have nonsuited 

 the plaintiff, and added, " That in order to warrant a verdict for the 

 plaintiir on such a declaration, they must be satisfied both that the dog 

 had before bitten some person, and that the defendant knew it." He 

 thought sufficient caution had not been used to secure the dog, and the 

 jury ibund a verdict for the plaintiff with £55 damages. Referring to 

 this case in Hartley v. Harriman, his lordship said, " I left it to the 

 jury in that case, to say whether the expression proved to have been 

 used by Mrs. Cox, cautioning a person not to go near the dog lest he 

 should be bitten, was not evidence from which they might infer that to 

 her knowledge the dog had previously bitten some person" (1 Stark. 285). 



Lord Kenijon C.J. admitted, in Jones v. Perry (2 Esp. 482), evidence 

 of a report that the doy had leen litten ly a mad doy previously, to sup- 

 port the second count of the declaration, whicli charged the defendant 

 with knowingly keeping a fierce and savage dog without being properly 

 secured. The dog had been tied up in a cellar by a rope of such length 

 that he reached the kerb-stone on the opposite side of the street, and 

 tore the plaintiff's child, who was carried to the salt water, but died of 



