IC-i KEEPING WATCH-DOGS. 



His lordship observed that if a man Iceops a dog in a garden walled all 

 rojoid, any one going in does so at his })eril. " Undoubtedly a man has 

 a rig-ht to keep a fierce dog for the protection of his property ; but he 

 has uo right to put the dog in such a situation, in the way of access to 

 his house, that a person innocently coming for a lawful purpose may be 

 injured by it, I think he has no right to place a dog so near to the 

 door of his house, that any person coming to ask for money or on other 

 business might be bitten. And so unlh respect to a footpath, tliough it he a 

 jyrivate one, a man has no right to 2^ul « dog with such a length of chain, 

 that he could lite a jJcrson going along it. As to the notice, it does not 

 appear to me that a painted notice is sufficient, unless the party is in 

 such a situation in life as to be able to avail himself of it. It does not 

 appear to me that this notice is sufficient so as to bar the action, if the 

 plaint ilf had any right at all to be on the spot, for it seems that he was 

 not able to read. Then was there anything in the appearance of the 

 dog which would lead the plaintiff to suppose that the dog would bite 

 liim ? It seems that the injury happened in the middle of the day, in 

 July, and that the plaintiff was a person employed as a watcher in the 

 neighbourhood ; and as no suspicion has been thrown upon him by the 

 other side, you may presume he was going to the house for a lawful 

 purpose. The only way in which I can leave the question (which I 

 admit is one of considerable nicety) for your consideration, is to leave 

 it to you to say on which side was the negligence on this occasion. If 

 there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff, he cannot recover for 

 an injury which he has in part brought upon himself; but if there was 

 no negligence on his part, and there was negligence on the part of the 

 defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to your verdict." The plaintiff 

 obtained a verdict for £20, and a rule nisi to set aside the verdict was 

 granted, but the case was settled before it came on for argument 

 (M. & M. 505). 



Again, Crowdcr J. ruled, on Besozzi v. Harris, where the defendant 

 owned a bear, which was fastened by a chain six feet long, on a ])art 

 of his premises accessible to excursionists (one of whom it seized) fre- 

 quenting his house on the Steep Holms in the Bristol Channel, that a 

 person keeping an animal of a fierce nature is bound so to keep it that 

 it shall not commit injury; and when therefore, such an animal does 

 damage, the owner is liable, though it be shown that it never had 

 evinced any fierceness, but evidence of its tameness is received under 

 particular circumstances, in reduction of damages. The evidence was 

 contradictory, as to the lady's knowledge of tlie bear being there, and 

 there was no notice or caution, written or verbal, to those visiting the 

 premises. 



