STEANGER HELPING SERVANT. 217 



Non-JlfihilH!/ of master for injury to servant from iiegliyence offdtow 

 servant. — The doctrine in Priestley v. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1 ; and 7 

 L. J. N. S. Ex. 42) that a master is not liable for an injury to his 

 servant arising from the negligence of a fellow-servant, ^^^^oi^^/ef/ he has 

 taken due care to iirovide proper macMnery and competent servants, was 

 upheld in Searle v. Lindsay and Others. 



Stiriiiger helpiny servant.— If a stranger, invited by a servant to assist 

 him in his work, is, while engaged in giving such assistance, injured by 

 the negligence of another servant of the same master in the com'se of 

 his employment, the stranger cannot hold the master responsible. The 

 stranger, by volunteering his assistance, cannot impose upon the master 

 a greater liability than that in which he stands towards his own ser- 

 vant ; and if the master takes care that his servants are persons of 

 competent skill and ordinary carefulness, he is not liable for any injury 

 that one of them may receive from the negligence of another. This 

 case affirmed the authority of Degg v. Tlie Midland Piailway Company 

 (1 H. & N. 773, and 26 L. J. N. S. Ex. 171), and the decision of the 

 Queen's Bench was affii-med {Potter v. Faulkner, 31 L. J. Q. B, 30). 



Proof of ivell-deflned negligence required. — In an action for an injury 

 occasioned by a defendant's negligence, e.g., negligent driving, the 

 plaintiflp, to warrant the judge in leaving the case to the jury, must 

 give 'proof of well-defmed negligence, and not merely some evidence of 

 negligence on the part of the defendant ; and where the evidence given 

 is equally consistent with there having been no negligence on the part 

 of the defendant as with there having been negligence, it is not com- 

 petent for the judge to leave it to the jury to find either alternative ; 

 such evidence must be taken as amounting to no proof of negligence. 

 It had been previously held, in Plgott v. Eastern Counties Railway 

 Company (3 C. B., 229), which was referred to in the plaintiff's argu- 

 ment, but not noticed in the judgment, that the fact of the premises 

 being fired by sparks from a passing engine is prima facie evidence 

 of neghgence, rendering it incumbent on the company to show that 

 lyome precautions had been adopted by them reasonably calculated to 

 prevent such accidents {Cotton v. Wood, 29 L. J. C. P. 333). 



blaster responsiUe for wilful conduct of servant if u'ithin scope of 

 his employment. — It was held by the Exchequer Chamber {Wightman J. 

 diss, and Cromjjton J. dull.), affirming the judgment of the Court of 

 Exchequer, that a master is responsible for the negligent act of his 

 servant, notwithstanding that it be done wilfully, and contrary to 

 express orders, if it be done within the scope of his employment, and in 

 executing the matter for which he is engaged. Here the omnibus- 

 driver of the defendant's had wilfully, and contraiy to express orders 



