250 CONDITION AS TO INSURANCE OF VALUABLE DOG. 



partially from fear or restiveuess. If the declared value of any horse 

 or other animal exceed £40, or any dog £5, the price of conveyance 

 T\"ill, in addition to the regular fare, be after the rate of 2| per cent, 

 upon the declared value above £40, whatever may be the amount of 

 such value, and for whatever distance the animal is to be carried." The 

 value of the dog was £21, but the plaintiff made no declaration of its 

 value, and paid only the regular fare 3s. The dog escaped from the 

 train, and was lost without any negligence on the part of the defend- 

 ants, and the plaintiflp having sued the defendants for the loss, it was 

 held by Coclihurii C.J. and Blaclchuni J., first that the meaning of 

 this ticket, the whole of Avhich must be read together, was that if the 

 value of a dog was above £5, and its value was not declared, and the 

 extra price paid accordingly, the defendants would not be liable at all 

 even for loss or injury caused by their own negligence, and that the 

 condition was therefore Avithin 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 7 ; secondly, 

 that this condition was " not just and reasonable," inasmuch as the 

 extra charge of 2| per cent, (without proof to the contrary, which it lay 

 on the defendants to give) appeared excessive and unreasonable ; and 

 thirdly, that the condition being void, although there was no negligence 

 on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the 

 full value of the dog against them as common carriers. It was held by 

 Wightmcui J. that the different clauses of the ticket were separable ; 

 that the first condition meant that the defendants would not be liable 

 beyond £5 for injury, however caused, unless the value of the dog were 

 declared, and that this was a reasonable condition, and afforded a good 

 defence beyond £5, which sum the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 

 The verdict was directed to stand for £21. 



Error was thereupon brought by the defendants to reverse tlie judg- 

 ment given by the Court of Queen's Bench for the plaintiff on a special 

 case : and it was held {diss. Wild B.), reversing the decision of the 

 Court below, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, Erie C.J. 

 and Kcaiiwj J. being of opinion that section 7 of 17 & 18 VicL 

 c. 31, Avas confined in its application to cases Avhere the loss or injury 

 Avas occasioned by the neglect or default of the company, and had no 

 bearing on such a case as the present, where the loss arose from pure 

 accident, and that the company Avere exempt from liability by the 

 terms of their contract. It was held further by Erie C.J., Williams J., 

 Channcll B., and Kealiiuj J., that assuming that the statute applied 

 to this case, the conditions in the ticket were reasonable and just, 

 and that they were not to be construed as meaning to exempt or as 

 having the effect of exempting the company from liability for loss 

 or injury occasioned by wilful misconduct on their part. And per 



