CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE 8 ANNE. £05 



which they neglected to pay. Pallesoii J. said : " Tiie words of the stat. 

 8 Annp, c. 14, s. 1 (which says that no goods shall be liable to be taken 

 by A'irtue of any execution, unless the party at whose suit the execution 

 is sued out shall, before the removal of such goods from off the premises 

 by virtue of such execution, pay to the landlord of the premises rent not 

 exccediug one year), cannot be taken literally. The true construction 

 is given in liiseleij v. Bylc, by Parka B. The meaning is that the 

 sheriff shall not remove the goods unless a year's rent shall be first paid. 

 The seizm'e is \^\^i\A inima facie ; but if the goods be removed without 

 payment of the rent, after notice that it is due, such removal renders 

 the whole proceeding unlawful as regards the landlord, and subjects the 

 sheriff to an action on the case at his suit. The goods, however, in the 

 meantime, until they are removed, are in custodid legis. A hill of sale of 

 ilie goods is not a removal, as was established in the case of Smallman v. 

 Pollard. If indeed the sheriff receives the proceeds under such bill of 

 sale, either from a stranger vendee absolutely, or fi'om the execution 

 creditor constructively, he being an officer of the Court, will be com- 

 pelled on motion to pay over a year's rent to the landlord {West v. 

 Hedges, Henchett v. Kimpson, and see Calvert v. Joliffe) ; but such bill of 

 sale and receipt will not amount to a removal so as to subject him to an 

 action. In the case of growing crops, possibly the sheriff may sell, 

 either for a sum of money to be paid immediately, or for a larger sum 

 to be paid on reaping and removing the crops ; and in the latter case 

 he could not be called upon by the landlord by motion to pay his rent 

 until the time came for removal of the crops. The landlord is in no 

 way injured hj this; for, if there had been no execution, and he had 

 distrained the crops for his rent, under statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, s. 8, he 

 could not sell them till they were reaped, and must therefore wait for 

 his money till that time. There seems, therefore, to be no reason why 

 he should be held to be authorized by the statute of Anne to do that 

 which at common law he could not do, namely, to distrain goods in 

 custodid legis, but rather that that act intended to give him protection 

 through the liability of the sheriff, in lieu of his right of distress, which 

 is taken away by the seizure under a fieri facias. This appears to be 

 the reasonable construction of the statute of Anne in regard to goods of 

 any kind seized by the sheriff, and it is more strongly so in regard to 

 growing crops, which, although liable to be taken in execution by the 

 common law, were not liable to be distrained for rent until the statute 

 11 Geo. II. c. 19." 



The decision in Peacock v. Par vis was expressly in point, and governed 

 Wright V. Dewes, and the Court in fact considered that the only distinc- 

 tion was that the seizure in the former case was in April, and in the 



