EXCESSIVE DISTRESS. SOt 



Jeft upon the premises ? It being a disputed question whether the straw 

 could be sold or not, the defendant sells that which he has a right to, 

 and leaves the rest." 



Ridgway v. Lord Stafford overruled Ahhcy v. Pekh. It was in case 

 for excessive distress, the fifth count charging the defendant with seUiiig 

 tlte plaint ff''s hay and manure under imjjrojjcr conditions and restrictions, 

 and for less than the liest prices. The plaintiff was tenant to the defend- 

 ant under a lease, by the covenants of which the plaintiff was bound to 

 consume all the hay and manure on the premises made thereon. The 

 defendant had distrained the hay and manure, and sold it subject to 

 this condition, and the sale had in consequence of this condition not 

 realized the amount it would if it had been absolute. The defendant 

 under Not guilty contended that he was justified in selling the goods on 

 such terms, and leave was reserved to defendant to move to reduce the 

 verdict from £166 15^. to £2Q 15s. Pollock C.B., in refusing a rule, 

 said, " The question raised on the motion made to reduce this verdict 

 was this, viz., whether when crops are taken as a distress, upon the 

 farm of a tenant, who is bound by the covenants of his lease to expend 

 such crops upon his farm, the crops ought to be sold with reference to 

 that covenant ; and whether if they are so sold, and on that account 

 fetch, as they naturally would, a much lower price than if sold without 

 such a condition, the landlord so seizing and selling them is liable to an 

 action for not selling for the best price. We think that in this case 

 there should be no rule, as we are of opinion that the effect of the 

 decisions upon the subject make the proposition plain." " On the 

 Avhole, therefore, we consider it to be decided that the sale of such pro- 

 duce, if it take place at all, ought to be irrespective of any covenants to 

 expend it upon the premises. A covenant to expend the produce on the 

 land is a covenant that cannot run with a chattel, and it is quite plain 

 that the tenant himself would have the power to sell without such a 

 condition, but would only be liable to his landlord for a breach of cove- 

 nant. If, therefore, he clearly might send the goods to market, and 

 sell them, the landlord who seizes the property must sell it in the 

 ordinary way, and for the best price." 



Wliere the defendant received a certain sum from the plaintiff for a 

 personal chattel, which hoth parties 'knew to have leen Irovght lender an 

 execution, and the plaintiff was prevented from taking possession of it by 

 a third party, who claimed under a superior title, it was held by the 

 Court of Queen's Bench that under such circumstances there was no 

 implied warranty of title by the defendant, and that the plaintiff could 

 not recover back the price paid by him, as upon a failure of considera- 

 tion {Chapman v. Speller). The true consideration here was the assign- 



