VALUERS 01" ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY. 333 



hum). There may possibly be (though qimre) an abandonment of the 

 entire agreement by parol, but at all events there can be no such partial 

 abandonment {ih.). It was decided in Cooper v. ShiiUlcwortli, that an 

 agreement to settle disputes between two parties, as to the amount to 

 be paid by one of them in respect of the value of the goods belonging 

 to or work done by the other of them, by a reference io iiro valuers, one 

 to be appointed by each party, does not import any undertaking by the 

 former that the valuer whom he may appoint shall act in the valuation, 

 nor any liability for his not acting. The party is only bound to appoint 

 a valuer on his part, and if the person appointed does not act, the other 

 party is remitted to his original cause of action, and may revoke his 

 submission, or may possibly, if the valuer has undertaken to act and 

 failed in his duty, have a right of action against him ; but has no right 

 of action against the party who appointed him. And see Lcdfimore v. 

 Garrard. 



One who holds himself out as a valuer of ecclesiastical ^^t'oper I u, though 

 he is not bound to possess a precise and accurate knowledge of the law 

 (as laid down in Wise v. Metcalfe) respecting the valuation of the 

 dilapidations as between outgoing and incoming incumbents, is bound 

 to bring to the performance of the duty he undertakes a knowledge of 

 the general rules applicable to the subject, and of the broad distinction 

 which exists between the cases of a valuation as between an incoming" 

 and outgoing tenant, and an incoming and outgoing incumhent (Jenkins 

 V. Betham). 



In Branscomhe v. Rowdiffe, the Court of Common Pleas upheld the 

 valuer, and declined to decide in a case where the defendant had refused 

 to abide by a valuation, whether he was right or wrong in only allowing 

 one ploughing on a part of the land where there had been a crop of 

 turnips, one portion only of which had come to maturity, and had been 

 consumed by the plaintiff; while he allowed three in respect of another 

 portion, which had not arrived at maturity, and had been ploughed 

 in ; besides other charges for " working out and turning stroyle," and 

 spreading lime, which the defendant contended was out of the scope of 

 the agreement of reference. The second objection in Cumberland v. 

 Boives was, that there was no such valuation as entitled the plaintiff to 

 recover, because the valuation delivered out by the umpire did not 

 pursue his authority, and the latter was functus officio when he altered 

 it. On this Maule J. observed : "The umpire was not functus; he had 

 not valued at all till he gave out the perfect valuation. If a man does 

 not communicate the value of a specific thing which he is employed to 

 value, he does not value it at all." When it was urged by the defen- 

 dant's counsel, that by this ruling every objection in the case of an 



