EEASONABLE USE OF RIGHT OF WAY. 357 



prove tlie cnttin.o- of tim])er in one part, T take that to l)e cyidcnce to 

 go to a jury to prove a right in the whole wood, although there should 

 be no fence or distinct boundary surrounding the whole ; and the case 

 of Stanley v. White, I conceive, is to be explained on this principle ; 

 there was a continuous belt of trees, and acts of ownership on one part 

 were held to be admissible to prove that the plaintiff was the owner of 

 another part, on which the trespass was committed. So I should apply 

 the same reasoning to a continuous hedge, though no doubt the defendant 

 might rebut the inference that the whole belonged to the same person, 

 by showing acts of ownership on his part along the same fence." 



Where premises are demised or conveyed " with right of way thereto," 

 it may be a question for the jury what is a reasonable use of such right. 

 And so in Hawldm v. Carbines, which was an action in tresjmss for 

 breaking locks and chains, and the defendant justiiied under an alleged 

 right of way through a gateway, across which the chain was fixed, and 

 the right of way was expressed to be " through the gateway " of the 

 plaintiff (which gateway led to other premises of the plaintiff), and at 

 the time of the lease carts could come in to load and unload, and turn 

 round and go out again, but through alterations of the premises could 

 not now do so without slightly trenching upon the plaintiff's pre- 

 mises, the Court of Exchequer held that in the reasonable use of the 

 right of way the defendants had a right to do this ; and that what 

 was a reasonable user was for the jury. 



It was decided by the Court of Common Pleas in Delctneij v. Fox, that 

 tJie rule hij which a tenant is estopped from denying the title of the land- 

 lord who let Mm into possession, is applicable in an action of trespass as 

 well as an ejectment, thus qualifying Pollock C.B.'s dictum in Watson 

 V. Lane, that the doctrine which prevents a party from denying his 

 landlord's title is peculiar to ejectment. On the termination of a lease, 

 the landlord cannot maintain trespass before entry. And so the cus- 

 tomary heir of a copyhold tenement cannot maintain trespass without 

 entry ; but after entry there is a relation back to the actual title, as 

 against a wrong-doer, and he may maintain an action for trespasses 

 committed prior to his entry (Barnett v. Earl of Guildford). 



3Iere permissive tenant has no right to sue a claimant under owner for 

 forcible entry. — Where the plaintiff used land as a garden for more than 

 20 years, under permission fi-oin the owner to do so in order to keep 

 it from trespassers, the owner from time to time coming on to the land, 

 and giving directions as to the cutting of trees, &c., it was held by Erie 

 C.J., that he had not got a title so as to enal)le him to sue a claimant 

 under the owner for forcible entry. The learned judge observed, " It 

 may be taken that the plaintiff had a beneficial occupation for more than 20 



