TAME PHEASANTS SUBJECTS OF LAECENY. 375 



A contract by a licensed dealer in game to deliver jiheasants in good 

 feather on request, followed by a request to deliver them more than ten 

 days from the time (February 1) when it is unlawful to kill them is 

 good, notwithstanding that statute 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 4, prohibits 

 the sale of birds of game at that period, because that section applies 

 to dead game only (Porritt v. Baker). And jjer Parke B. : " There is 

 nothing in the statute to prevent the defendants selling and delivering 

 live pheasants out of season, since they can either buy pheasants from 

 a person who keeps them in a mew, or can keep them in a mew of 

 their own " {ib.) And it was ruled by Lord Camjjhell C. J., in Reg. v. 

 Head, that 'pheasants which have been reared under hens in coops, through 

 the bars of which they could pass, and which had at the time of the 

 robbery been hatched a month, and could fly thirty rods, and answer to 

 the keeper's whistle at night, were as much the subject of larceny as 

 the hens themselves. 



Deer in a park {though an ancient and legal park) mag be so tamed 

 and reclaimed from their natural wild state as to pass to executors as 

 personal propertg ; and so it was held by the Court of Common Pleas, 

 in Morgan v. Abergarenng, where the executors successfully brought 

 trover against the heir. 



But it is laid down in Paslet v. Gray, that where a man, having 

 fishes in a pond, made his executors, and died, and defendant as exe- 

 cutor takes fishes, plaintiff as heir brings trespass rightly ; for they are 

 as profits of the freehold, which the executor shall not have, but the 

 heir, or he who hath the water. Ti'espass Iks for breaking and entering 

 the several fisherg of A. on the soil of B. (Baileg v. Holford) ; but the 

 words "sole and exclusive fishery" are not equivalent to " several " 

 fishery (/&.). 



In the case of Saunders v, Baldg, 1 N. R. Q. B. 87, an information 

 was laid by the appellant, under 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 23, against the 

 respondent, charging him with having, on the 13th of March, 1865, used 

 a trap for the purpose of taking game, he not having a game certificate. 

 The 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 3, forbids the taking game during certain 

 intervals of the year, and the justices dismissed the information on the 

 ground that as no certificate would authorize persons to take or kill 

 game at the period mentioned, the respondent could not be said not to 

 be authorized for want of a certificate, and therefore could not be legally 

 convicted upon an information which charged him with using an instru- 

 ment for the purpose of taking game without a certificate, when no 

 game certificate could be obtained which would authorize his act. The 

 Court, however, decided that the respondent ought to have been con- 

 victed. 



