CONVICTION FOR TRESPASS. 377 



possible in point of law. Game statutes are not mere criminal statutes, 

 but are statutes passed for the purpose of protecting the peculiar right 

 of those entitled to shoot game (Wafkins v. Ifajor, 10 L. R. C. P. 662 ; 

 see llorden v. Porter, 29 L. J. M. C. 213 ; Leatt v. Vim, 30 L. J. M. C. 

 207 ; Gornwell v. Saunders, 32 L. J. M. C. 6 ; Hudson v. M'Crea, 33 

 L. J. M. C. 65). 



Picking up ^^heasmit shot in another'' s land a tresjiass. — A person who 

 in his own land shoots a pheasant in the land of another, and goes on to 

 such land to pick the bird up, commits a trespass of entering land in 

 pursuit of game within the meaning of 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 30, the 

 shooting and picking up of the bird being one transaction, but qua>re 

 whether entering land for the purpose of picking up dead game is a 

 trespass within that Act. And per Byles J. : " If it were necessary 

 for us to decide on this occasion, that dead game is within the statute, 

 I should have desired time to consider. But I agree that the pursuit 

 commenced with the shot, and terminated with the picking up. There 

 was a pursuit and a trespass. It would be highly inconvenient to have 

 to inquire in every case wliether the bird had breathed its last or not 

 when picked up" (Oslond appt. v. Meadows resp.). 



Not essential to conviction for trespass in pursuit of game, that there 

 should have heen an intention to commit such tresjMss. — It is not necessary 

 that a conviction under 1 & 2 Will lY. c. 32, s. 30, for a trespass in 

 pursuit of game, should be on the information of the owner or occupier 

 of land, or of a party interested in the game, and on this point Middleton 

 V. Gale (8 Ad. & E. 155) is decisive, and semble per Williams, J. and 

 Willes J., dubitante Keating J., that it is not necessary, in order to 

 support a conviction under the above section, that the defendant should 

 have intended to commit or have been conscious that he was committing 

 a trespass. And per Willknns J. : " The dictum of Erie J. in Reg. v. 

 Cridland (7 E. & B. 853, 27 L. J. (N. S.) M. C. 28) is relied on by the 

 defendant's counsel ; but that case is wholly distinguishable, for it only 

 decides that where the entry is made under a hand fide claim of right, no 

 proceedings can be maintained against the person so entering upon the 

 land. But that is upon a principle not peculiar to this case, but appli- 

 cable to all cases, that no conviction can take place for an act done 

 under a bond fide claim of right to do it. In the case of Reg. v. Pratt 

 (2-1 L. J. (N. S.) M. C. 113), where the defendant was convicted of a 

 trespass, although he never left the high road, the whole discussion was 

 whether there was a trespass on another man's land ; no one thought of 

 suggesting that the defendant would not be liable if he had thought 

 that he had a right to shoot on the high road. With regard to the 

 hardship of thus deciding, I confess I cannot see it. If a person goes 



