DECOYS. 385 



show any right to have them resort thither, and therefore he cannot 

 maintain an action against any one for firing guns near it and causing 

 them to desert {Hannam v. Mockott). 



This case differed from Keehle v. Hickeringill, where it was decided 

 that an action on the case lies for discharging guns near the decoy of 

 another, ivith design to damnify ths owner hy frightening away the tvild- 

 fowl resorting thereto, and by which the wild-fowl are ftightened away 

 and the owner damnified. In the first place, wild-fowl are protected 

 by 25 Hen. YIII. c. 11 (a.d. 1533-34), which forbids every one except 

 a forty- shilling fi-eeholder to take wild-fowl, to wit, " ducks, mallards, 

 widgeons, teals, wild-geese, and divers other kind of wild-fowl," and 

 only permits them the use of a spaniel and a longbow for that pur- 

 pose. The statute of 3 & 4 Edii\ VI. c. 7, which repeals that of 

 25 Hen. VIII., takes notice of wild-fowl, and hath the general word 

 wildrfoivl, without coming to particulars. They also constitute a 

 known article of food ; and a person keeping a decoy, spends money 

 and employs skill in taking that which is of use to the public. It is 

 consequently a profitable mode of employing his land, and is con- 

 sidered by Lord Holt C. J. as a description of trade. Carrington v. 

 Taylor vfSi's, governed by Keehle y. Hiclcer in giU ; and it was there held 

 that as the defendant, being out shooting wild-fowl on part of an 

 open salt-water creek called The Blackwater, on the Essex shore, first 

 fired his fowling-piece about a quarter of a mile from the plaintiff's 

 decoy, when 200 or 300 wild-fowl came out, and afterwards, ap- 

 proaching nearer, fired at wild-fowl on the wing at the distance of 200 

 yards from the decoy, where he killed several widgeons, and caused 

 400 or 500 wild-fowl to fly from the decoy, though he did not fire into 

 it, this was evidence of a wilful disturbance of the decoy, for which an 

 action on the case would lie. 



Where a demise was made of a mansion-house and land, with the 

 sole licence of shooting and sporting over all other the lands of the 

 lessor, " subject to the liberty for each tenant on hi^farm to Mil rabbits 

 thereon with ferrets 07ilg ;" this exception as to killing rabbits extends 

 not only to farms existing at the time of the demise, but also to other 

 lands, as plantations, subsequently let as farms {Newton v. Wilmot). 

 A demise of lands, excepting and reserving all rogalties, with a clause 

 for the lessor to be allowed to prosecute actions against persons tres- 

 passing for the purpose of hunting, &c., does not amount to a grant 

 by the lessee of a liberty for the lessor to enter for the purpose of pur- 

 suing, killing, and taking birds of warren (Pannell v. Mill). And per 

 Coltman J. : "The present case is distinguishable from that of TlVr^-- 

 ham V. Hawker ; as in that case the clause excepting and reserving 



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