386 SPORTING OVER CATTLEGATES. 



the liberty to hunt, &c., could not by possibility operate as an excep- 

 tion or reservation. In the present case it is not so, for a royalty may 

 by laT? be appurtenant to land as in this very case of warren ; a man 

 may have warren in his own land, or in that of another man by pre- 

 scription (Bro. Abr. tit. "Warren, pi. 2), And in the case of Boivhton v. 

 Hanh/, it is said a warren is not parcel, nor any member of a manor ; 

 though it may be appertaining, but that is, by prescription. And it is 

 said in Di/cr, page 30, n (209), and in the ' Year Book,' in SliJe v. 

 Abbot of Tctrhxhiiri/ (T. 8 H, 7, fo. 4), that a man may have warren 

 in the land of another as appendant to his manor ; and if the manor is 

 granted cinn periineniiis, the warren will pass." [ib.) 



It was decided in error from the Court of Exchequer (which had been 

 equally divided on the point) that the customary right of pasture in a 

 manor or cattlrgates gives the owners no right to possession of the soil ; 

 but the ownership of it remains in the lord of the manor, subject to 

 the right of several pasture upon it by the cattlegate owners, and 

 therefore the lord may maintain trespass against a cattlegate owner 

 for sporting over it without his permission {Rigg v. Earl of Lonsdale.) 

 And it was held by the Court of Common Pleas, in Greathead v. Morley, 

 that the right of sporting over the allotments of the moor or common in 

 question was not reserved to the lord of the manor by the saving clause in 

 the Inclosure Act, "with/re^ uxirren, and liberty of hunting, hawking, 

 fishing and fowling," the object of that clause being to reserve to the 

 lord all those manorial rights which he possessed before the inclosure, 

 as lord, except the right to the soil ; the power of a lord to sport over 

 a waste within his manor being not a licence or liberty, but a mode of 

 enjoyment of his own property. 



The ai.pellant in Meddins v. Williams had been convicted under stat. 

 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 32, for tresjiassing upon certain land inclosed 

 under an Inclosure Act, in company with five or more persons. It ap- 

 peared that the appellant had the consent of the allottee of the inclosed 

 land, but not of Sir "Watkin W. Wynn, who was the lord of the manor, 

 to whom the right of taking game was said to be reserved. It was con- 

 tended, in support of the conviction, upon the authority of Graham v. 

 Ewart, that the right to take the game was clearly in the lord of the 

 manor, and that although the appellant had the consent of the allottee, 

 he was nevertheless a trespasser within the Act. Lord Campbell C. J. 

 said, " It was clear, after the decision in that case, that the right to take 

 game in the locus in quo was exclusively in the lord of the manor. 

 The question was a nice and difficult one, but the Court was bound 

 by that decision. The lord of the manor was not entitled to the 

 right ralione soli, but it was confiimed to him in the hands of the 



