390 SPRING-GUNS. 



judges, in Jordin v. Crump. The questiou here was whether the 

 plaintitf was entitled to compensation for the death of or an injury 

 done to his dog, who by reason of his own natural instinct, and against 

 the will of his master, ran off the path, after a rabbit which crossed it, 

 against certain dog-spears, which were set by the defendant in his 

 wood, and of whicli tlie plaintitf admitted he had notice. The Court 

 considered that this was a stronger case than Deane v. Clayton, and said 

 that if a man chose to walk with his dog along a footpath through 

 ground on which the latter might commit a trespass, he knew the risk 

 he was running. 



Per Ahlerson J. : " Illoff v. Wilkes was decided previously to the 

 passing of the 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 18, and was the case of a party tres- 

 passiny in a wood, ivith notice that spriny-yuns were set there ; but the 

 Court of Queen's Bench held that he was not entitled to recover against 

 the owner of the wood for damage done him thereby, it having been his 

 own fault to go where spring-guns were set, for with that knowledge on 

 his part spring-guns ceased to be secret engines of mischief. The case 

 was similar to that of a trespasser endeavouring to climb a wall, who 

 should hurt himself by coming in contact in the dark with spikes, or 

 broken glass stuck upon it, in a case where it appeared that he had a 

 previous opportunity of observing in broad daylight that such means of 

 mischief were placed on the wall. The otlier was the case of Bird v. 

 Holbrooh, which was decided after the passing of the statute 7 & 8 

 Geo. IV. c. 18. That was a case where the defendant, for the protection 

 of his propert}^ set a spriny-yim in a walled yarden, not only without 

 giving notice, but where it appeared by tlie evideuce that he had pur- 

 posely abstained from giving any, in order that the thief (as he said) 

 miglit be detected. The plaintiff" was in search of a stray pea-hen ; and 

 liaving trespassed in the garden, the spring-gun went off, and injured 

 him severely. On this the Court of Common Pleas held that he was 

 entitled to maintain an action against the defendant ; but the reason of 

 this decision was that seiliny spriny-yans 'without a notice was, even 

 independently of the statute, an unlawful act. The correctness of this 

 position may perhaps be questioned ; but if it be sound, the decision in 

 that case was right. Our judgment, however, in the present case 

 proceeds on the ground that to set dog-spears in this wood was a per- 

 fectly legal act on the part of the defendant." The setting of dog-spears 

 is not in itself an illegal act, nor is it rendered such by the stat. 7 & 8 

 Geo. IV. c. 18, s. 1, which prohibits the setting or placing of man-traps 

 or other engines calculated to destroy human life, or inflict grievous 

 liodily harm, with intent that or whereby the same may destroy human 

 life or inflict grievous bodily harm. 



