4H TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEAR. 



pointed out the distinction : " In every contract for the sale of a lease 

 the agreement is to sell an interest in the land ; that is not so in the 

 case of the sale of an agreement. The question is one which depends 

 upon the words of the contract. It has been decided that the grant of 

 a lease means the grant of an absolute right of enjoyment for a certain 

 number of years ; and there is therefore on the sale of a lease an implied 

 term that the vendor shall show the lessor's title. Here there is merely 

 the purchase of an agreement. Whatever benefit the agreement gave 

 to the plaintiff the defendant is entitled to. It is utterly uncertain 

 ^vhat the terms of the agreement between the plaintiff and E. C. his 

 landlady are ; but any right which the defendant may have to call for 

 proof of the lessor's title rests upon that agreement, and must be the 

 right which the plaintiff had against E. C, and which by the contract is 

 transferred to the defendant." And per LitiMak J.: "Where parties 

 enter under a mere agreement for a future lease they are tenants at 

 will ; and if rent is paid under the agreement they become tenants from 

 year to year, determinable on the execution of the lease contracted for, 

 that being the primary contract. But if no rent is paid, still before the 

 execution of a lease the relation of landlord and tenant exists, the 

 parties having entered with a view to a lease and not a purchase " 

 {Hamerton v. Stead). 



Although it may be that ichcrc an actual demise is made generally at 

 a yearJij rent, and noth'mg is said as to the duration of the term, a tenancy 

 from year to year tvould be im2)licd ; yet wdiere, from the terms of an 

 agreement for a lease, coupled with surrounding circumstances, it is 

 ambiguous what term is intended to be conveyed, such agreement is 

 void for uncertainty. And so it was held by the Exchequer Chamber 

 in Fitzmaurice v. Bayley. By increasing the amount of rent payable by 

 a tenant from year to year, a new tenancy is not necessarily created ; much 

 must depend upon what was said at the time the additional sum was 

 agreed to be paid (JJoe dem. Clonic v. Geekie). The Court of Common 

 Pleas considered that the umpire was right in refusing to admit evi- 

 dence to show that by the custom of the trade of brickmaking, brick laud 

 is always let for a longer period than from year to year (In re Stroud). 



The argument in Tress v. Savage turned npon the effect of 7 & 8 Vict. 

 c. 76. There the plaintiff and defendant, after stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 

 came into operation, executed a written instrument not under seal, on 

 December 17th, 1850, by which Tress agreed to let, and Savage to hire 

 land for a term exceeding three years, at a rent payable monthly, from 

 December 2.5th of that year. Savage entered, and it was afterwards 

 orally agreed that the rent should be paid quarterly. The Court of 

 Queen's Bench held that stat. 8 & 9 Vkt. c. 106, s. 3, though rendering 



