MEANING OF "SUBJECT MATTER " IN STAMP ACT. 417 



farm and separate covenants, some applying to one farm and some to 

 the other. The lessee entered on the whole at the same time, and it 

 was held that one ad-valorcm stamp, calculated on the united amounts 

 of the two rents, was sufficient. So an agreement containing a demise of 

 land at a certain rent, and of other land at the same as ivas then paid for 

 it ly a tenant, but not describing the amount, is well stamped by one 

 ad-vatorem stamp, calculated upon the whole amount of rent to be paid 

 Jbr all the lands, the tenant's rent being proved by witnesses {Parry v. 

 Deere). 



Where A. entered into a written agreement with B., for the hire of a 

 piece of land for the purpose of making bricks, and C. afterwards made 

 an offer in writing to let another piece of land to A., upon the terms 

 contained in the agreement between A. and B., which offer A., at a sub- 

 sequent period, verbally accepted ; in an action by C. for a breach of 

 some of the terms of this contract, it was held by the Court of Queen's 

 Bench that the written offer by G. was admissible in evidence ivithout 

 being stamjied (Brant v. Broivn). The alteration of an agreement 

 stipulating to give up the holding and occupation of a farm, by the 

 addition of the words " house and premises," after that agreement has 

 been completed, is not such an alteration as will render the affixing 

 of a new stamp necessary, house and premises being included within the 

 meaning of the term " farm " {Doe dem. Waters v. Houghton). 



The " subject matter " of an agreement to talce land, within the mean- 

 ing of the Stump Act, is the right of occupation, measured by the total 

 amount of reut to be paid for the whole period of such occupation. An 

 agreement in the following form — " I, J. T., do hereby agree with W. M. 

 to retake of him two acres of land, &c., from the 10th of October, ISiO, 

 at which time my tenancy thereof expires, until the 25th of March, 1841, 

 for the sum of £10," with a promise by J. T. to allow W. M. to plant 

 fruit trees, and to deliver up possession at the end of the time ; and signed 

 by J. T.,but not by W. M.— was held by the Court of Queen's Bench in 

 Doe dem. Marloiu v. Wiggins to be neither a lease nor an agreement, in 

 which the matter was of the value of £20, and therefore to require no 

 stamp. 



And jjer Patteson J, : " If this document is a lease no doubt it re- 

 quires a stamp. But it cannot be so, because there is no person de- 

 mising, no lessor. I do not say that it is not binding on the party who 

 executed ic, but simply that it is no lease. Ricliardson \. Gifford does 

 not determine that. The Court in that case gave no opinion that the 

 instrument was a lease, and merely determined that the covenantor was 

 bound by it as an agreement. Gooclt v. Goodman is a very peculiar case, 

 and the Court there also gave no opinion whether the instrument operated 



