ENFORCING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENT. 471 



sion or total destruction, the defendant may pay money into court in 

 respect of the damage to the plaintiff's share ; and as to the residue, 

 plead liherum tenementuni, or traverse the plaintift"s property (Gresswell 

 V. Hedges). 



Taking farm and iKiging tenant-right to false devisee. — A defendant 

 who had taken a farm without any agreement, but by arrangement 

 for a yearly tenancy, he paying the usual tenant-right, which included 

 a valuation for dung for which £Q2 was paid to the person in posses- 

 sion and claiming as devisee under a will, was held by Williams J. 

 liable in trover when the will was set aside to the plaintiff, who took 

 out letters of administration, as the personalty vested in him by relation 

 (Learson v. Eoiinson). 



Enforcing sjMci/ic 2)e7farmance of farming agreement. — An agreement 

 for a farming lease was entered into in October, 1855, for twelve years. 

 In February, 1859, the landlord gave notice to quit, on the ground of 

 the lands not being farmed according to the agreement. In November, 

 1859, the tenant paid the balance of rent up to the previous Michael- 

 mas, the receipt expressing that it was without prejudice to any ques- 

 tion. In December, 1859, an action of ejectment was commenced, and 

 thereupon the tenant filed a bill for specific performance of the agree- 

 ment, and to restrain the action ; the evidence as to the tenant's 

 farming was conflicting. A decree was made by one of the Vice- 

 Chancellors for specific performance of the agreement ; the lease to bo 

 dated in October, 1855, and the tenant to admit in any action for 

 breach of covenant that the lease was executed at that date, and an in- 

 junction to restrain the action was granted, and on appeal this decree 

 was confirmed. And per Lord Chancellor Camjjbell, affirming Stuart 

 V.-C.'s decree : " The cases of Gregorg v. Wilson (9 Hare, 683, & 22 

 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 159) and Lewis y. Bo?id (18 Beav. 85) are well decided ; 

 and I mean entirely to be bound by the doctrines there laid down. If 

 there has been a breach of the agreement, and if there has been what 

 would have amounted to a breach of the covenants which ought to have 

 been introduced into the lease had the lease been granted, which 

 would have worked a forfeiture, and that is clearly made out, then 

 there is an answer to the bill, and specific performance should not be 

 decreed. But if that is not made out, then I think the proper course 

 to be adopted is that which was adopted in the two cases that have 

 been referred to, of Pain v. Coombs (1 De Gex & Jo. 34) and Lillic v. 

 Legh (3 De Gex & Jo. 204), which is to decree specific performances, 

 and to direct that the lease should bear date at the date of the 

 agreement, giving the landlord the opportunity, if he thinks lit, of 

 bringing an ejectment for the forfeiture, and so to recover possession 



