WHAT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTANCE OF SEED. 503 



exercise a dominion over them, and deals luiih them in a manner incon- 

 sistent tvith the right of property teing in the vendor, that is evidence to 

 justify the jury in finding that the vendee has accepted the goods, and actu- 

 ally received the same. Hanson v. Armitage and Norman v. Phillips are 

 express authorities that a wharfinger or a carrier is not the agent of a 

 vendee, so as to hind him hg acceptance of the goods. In Meredith v. 

 Megh, Lord Campbell C.J. expressly overruled Hart v. Sattlcy, where 

 Chamlre J. ruled that if goods are ordered verbally, the delivery to a 

 carrier who has been used to deliver goods between the parties is 

 sufficient to bind the contract, according to the 17th section of the 

 Statute of Frauds. Of 3Iorton v. Tihhetts his Lordship also remarked 

 in that judgment, " The vendee there resold the wheat at a profit, and 

 altered its destination in the carrier's hands {by sending it to another 

 wharf), and that was held to be evidence of an acceptance and receipt." 



In Coombes v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, the plaintiff 

 agreed with one Avery by a verbal contract for the purchase of goods 

 exceeding £10 in value, to be scat to the, plaintiff by the Bristol and 

 Exeter Raihvay. The goods were sent by such railway by Avery, 

 addressed to the plaintiff, and were lost during their conveyance. It 

 was held by the Court of Exchequer that the plaintiff could not sue the 

 railway company, because the contract being verbal there had been 

 nothing to ratify the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, the delivery 

 to the railway company being no delivery to the purchaser ; that the 

 property had therefore not passed, and Avery, not the plaintiff, was the 

 party to sue. Martin B. said, " I adhere to what I am reported to 

 have said in Hunt v. Hecht, that there is no acceptance unless the pur- 

 chaser has exercised his option, or has done something that has deprived 

 him of his option. There was nothing to prevent the vendee rejecting 

 the goods if they had been delivered to him on the ground that there 

 had been no contract to satisfy the 17th section of the Statute of 

 Frauds." 



A curious point as to tvhnf constitutes an acceptance of seed arose in 

 ParJcer v. iVallis. The plaintiff, a farmer, made in June a verbal con- 

 tract with the defendants, at Bury market, for the sale of turnip-seed 

 exceeding £10. It was harvested and thrashed in July, and on the 

 24th of that month 20 sacks of it were sent to the defendants. Plaintiff 

 and one of the defendants again met at Bury market, and the latter 

 said he had just had a message that the seed was out of condition, 

 which the plaintiff denied. Soon afterwards the defendants wrote to 

 plaintiff, rejecting the seed, and in one of the letters informed him that 

 *' the 20 sacks which you authorised us to receive for you and lay out 

 thin, in consequence of its being hot and mouldy," would be returned. 



