508 WHAT ACKNOWLEDGMENT TAKES DEBT OUT OE STATUTE. 



100s. percwt. ; and it was not even argued that the apparent ambiguity 

 as to the price caused by the omission of any statement of the quantity 

 for which the 100.^. was to be paid, rendered the note or memorandum 

 insufficient to satisfy the 17th section." 



A contract for tJie sale of shares in a mining company, conducted, upon 

 th-e cosf-hooJc principle, was held by the Court of Exchequer {Parlce B. 

 diss.) not to be one for the sale of land, or any interest in it within 

 section 4 of the Statute of Frauds ; but per Curiam, it is not a contract 

 for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandizes within section 17 of the 

 same statute {Watson v. Spratlcij). 



The question as to what acliuowtcdgment ivill take a debt out of the 

 Statute of Limitations has been the subject of a very recent Exchequer 

 Chamber decision in Rackham v. Marriott. In this case the debtor, in 

 answer to an application for payment of a debt, wrote as follows : " I 

 do not wish to avail myself of the Statute of Limitations to refuse the 

 payment of the debt. I have not the means of payment, and must 

 crave a continuance of your indulgence. My situation as a clerk does 

 not afford me the means of laying by a shilling, but in time I may reap 

 the benefit of my services in augmentation of salary that may enable 

 me to propose some satisfactory arrangement. I am much obliged to 

 you for your forbearance." The Exchequer Chnmber, confirming the 

 judgment of the Court of Exchequer, decided that the letter contained 

 no sufiicient acknowledgment or jDromise to take the case out of the 

 statute. CocJcburn C.J. said : " Here the defendant merely expresses a 

 hope that circumstances will enable him, not to pay, but to propose a 

 satisfactory arrangement, and he says that he will not avail himself of 

 the statute. That does not amount to a promise to pay, but is rather 

 holding out an inducement to the plaintiff to let him alone, and trust to 

 his sense of honour. There is here an acknowledgment of a debt, but 

 not an acknowledgment coupled with a promise to pay either on demand 

 or at a future period which has elapsed, or on a condition which has 

 been fulfilled. An acknowledgment without a promise is not sufficient 

 to take a case out of the Statute of Limitations. Looking to the 

 current of authorities, and more especially to the last case, Smith v. 

 Thome, and being of opinion that the principle is applicable to the 

 present case, we think that the acknowledgment must amount to a 

 promise to pay either on request or at a future period, or on a condition. 

 Here there is a mere expression of hope to make some satisfiictory 

 arrangement, not an acknowledgment coupled with a promise to pay." 



In Sidu'dl V. Mason the letter was as follows : " I have received your 

 bill. It does not specify sufficiently to which cottages the work is 

 done ; for instance (specifying some of the items), I do not know 



