GENERAL RULE FOR HORSE-DEALING. 553 



bought of the defendant two horses and the following memorandum 

 was signed by defendant at the time of sale : 



"June Uh, 1865. 



"Mr. Chapman bought of Mr. G. Gwyther, a brown horse six years 

 old, warranted sound, for £180 : also a bay horse five years old 

 for £90. Warranted sound. 



" George Gwyther. 

 " Warranted sound for one month. 



"George Gwyther." 



It was held that the latter words limited the duration of the warranty. 

 The general rule for horse-dealing was thus laid down by 3IauJe J. in 

 Keates v. Earl Cadogan : " If a horse-dealer contracts to sell a gentle- 

 man a horse fit to carry him, and he sells him one which he knows to 

 be unfit for the purpose, he does not perform his contract. But if a 

 man buys a horse generally, the seller will not be responsible, although 

 knowing that his customer wanted the horse for his own riding, he sells 

 him one which will not carry him." If there has been a parol agree- 

 ment, which is afterwards reduced by the parties into writing, that 

 writing must alone be looked to, to ascertain the terms of the contract ; 

 but where, as in Allen v. Pinlc, the plaintiff merely received the following 

 memorandum from the seller : — ■ 



" Bought of G. Pink a horse for the sum of £7 2s. Qd. 



"G. Pink," 



and brought an action to- recover back the price he had paid for the 

 horse, which proved unruly and vicious in harness, he was allowed to 

 give parol evidence of a warranty given him by the defendant at the 

 time of the sale, to the effect that he was a quiet worker, and would go 

 well in spare harness. A fraudulent representation at the time of sale in- 

 validates the ivarranty ; though it does not relate to any point included 

 in it; and in Steward v. Cocsvclt, where the written warranty was 

 simply to the effect that the horse was ''sound, and free from vice," 

 Burrough B. admitted, as general evidence of fraud, that the horse 

 was represented at the time of sale as five off, whereas he was only 

 rising five. But Geddes v. Pennington is an authority to show that 

 if the warranty is answered, a mere trivial misrepresentation as to the 

 place from which the horse was procured would not suffice to set aside 

 the sale. A representation must he Icnown to he false ; and hence where 

 as in Dickenson v. Gapp^ the receipt ran thus : — 



