556 REFUSAL OF MASTEFv TO CONFIRM WARRANTY. 



servant, who is merely authorized to deliver a horse, does not bind the 

 principal ; and that in an action on the warranty, the seller is not bound by 

 the statements or receipt of the servant, as no express authority to give 

 the wai-ranty was shown. Bayley J. said : " What is said by a servant 

 is not evidence against the master, unless he has some authority given 

 him to make the representation; and the question here is whether there 

 is reasonable ground for inferring such authority. It is quite clear 

 that before the time when the horse was delivered to the plaintiff, and 

 the receipt was given, there had been a bargain between tlie defendant 

 and the plaintiff, and all that the servant was directed to do was to take 

 the horse to the plaintiff and receive the money. It seems to me that, 

 althou!;h a warranty given by a person entrusted to sell p-imCi facie 

 binds the principal, yet the warranty of a person entrusted merely to 

 deliver is not prima facie binding on the principal, but an express 

 authority must be shown, which was not done here." Jordan v. Nor- 

 ton is also an author ity to show tluit where an agent is merely instructed to 

 receive and pay for a horse if a certain ivarranty is given, and he brings it 

 home without one, the principal may repudiate his ad, and return it tvithin 

 areasonahJe time. 



The rule of laiv as to a master taJcifig hade a horse, and returning the 

 money if he will not stand to a ivarranty improperly given hy his servant, 

 was thus touched upon by Lord Ahinger C.B., in Cornfoot v. FoivTce-. 

 " Put," said his lordship, " the ordinary case of a servant employed 

 to sell a horse, but expressly forbidden to warrant him sound: is it 

 contended that the buyer, induced by the warranty to give ten times 

 the price which he would have given for an unsound horse, when he 

 discovers the horse to be unsound, is not entitled to rescind the con- 

 tract ? This would be to say that though the principal is not bound 

 by the false representation of an agent, yet he is entitled to take ad- 

 vantage of that false representation for the purpose of obtaining a 

 contract beneficial to himself which lie could not have obtained with- 

 out it." 



If an agent is guilty of fraud in transacting his principiaVs business, the 

 irrincipal is responsible; and where a principal claims the purchase- 

 money by virtue of a contract made for him by his agent, which was 

 defeasible by reason of fraud, and is put an end to by the vendee, the 

 a'J'ent holds the purchase-money as received to the use of the vendee. 

 This was the tenor of the decision in Murray v. Ma?in, which was an 

 action by a livery-stable keeper for the keep of a horse, to which the de- 

 fendant pleaded a set-off for money received by the plaintiff for his use. 

 The defendant had sent the horse to the livery-stables of the plaintiff, 

 where it stood for some time, and was sold for £125, with a warranty 



