PARTNERSHIP IN A HORSE. 559 



warranty is not always conclusive evidence ; and ib was held not to be 

 so where the warranty was introduced into the receipt by an after- 

 thought of the defendant's coachman, and signed by the plaintiff, who 

 was merely a marksman {Fairmaner v. Budd). 



The following " memorandum of agreement between "William Short 

 and William Brooke — which is, the horse to be £34, William Brooke 

 to have half at <£17, and to pay half the horse's expenses being with 

 Job Marson from his arriving at Malton, Feb. 1, 1831, &c.," and duly 

 signed by the parties, was decided on the authority of Venning v. Leclcie 

 to be an agreement for an undivided moiety of a horse within the above 

 exception in 55 Geo. III. c. 184, and not to require a stamp {Marson v. 

 Shm^t). The question of partner shij) in a horse was very much discussed 

 in French v. Stijring, where the plaintiff and defendant, being partners 

 in a horse (Census), agreed that the plaintiff should have the entire 

 management of it, and that the expense of the keep, training, and 

 running him should be borne, and his winnings should be shared by 

 both equally. The horse won nothing ; and the plaintiff having paid 

 the whole of the expenses, it was held that even if a partnership existed 

 between the plaintiff and the defendant in the management and running 

 of the horse, half the sum expended by the plaintiff was in the nature 

 of an advance by him of capital on behalf of the defendant, and which 

 he was entitled to recover from the defendant. And semlle per Coclcburn 

 C.J., that the agreement constituted a partnership between the plaintiff 

 and the defendant ; and per Wiltes J., that it was rather an agreement 

 between two tenants in common (who had acquired a title to the horse 

 at different times and by different contracts) as to the management of 

 their common property, than a partnership. 



In an action on a warranty (Cotlins v. Jenhins), a letter written by 

 plaintiff's attorney in Middlesex, apprising the defendant of the breacli 

 of the warranty, and that the horse was standing at livery at the 

 defendant's expense, coupled with an admission in Middlesex by 

 defendant's agent of the receipt of such letter, was held sufficient to satisfy 

 an undertaking to give material evidence of some matter in issue arising in 

 that county. Tindal C.J. said : " It appears to me that this case is 

 determined by that of Curtis v. Drinhwater. The letter written by the 

 plaintiff's attorney was material to a point in issue, since its object was 

 to increase the damages. The proof that such a letter was written in 

 the county of Middlesex, coupled with the admission by defendant's 

 agent in the same county of its having been received, was according 

 to the principle of that case a compliance with the plaintiff's under- 

 taking. 



In Greenwag v. Titchmarsh, where the venue had been clianged from 



