SPLINTS PRODUCING LAMENESS. 571 



lameness, amounted to an unsoundness ; and Alderson B. observed 

 that, " The law as laid down by me in Dklcinson y. Follctt has not 

 been questioned in any subsequent case." 



Cressivell J. also ruled in accordance with this doctrine in BaiJeij v 

 Forrest, where it was contended for the defendant that the mere fact of 

 a horse Tjeing thin-soled did not of itself make him unsound, and that 

 the plaintiff could not recover on the warranty, although the horse fell 

 lame shortly after the sale. " The plaintiff," said his lordship, " must 

 prove that the horse was unsound at the time of the sale, or he cannot 

 recover. Mere defective formation not producing lameness at the time 

 of sale, does not, in my opinion, constitute unsoundness." 



The subject of splints was very much considered in Margetson v. 

 Wright. Here the plaintiff, an attorney, being desirous of possessing 

 a race-horse, went to examine the defendant's stallion Sara])Son, who, 

 in addition to being a crib-biter, had a splint on the oflF fore-leg, and 

 had broken down in training. In consequence of these defects the 

 plaintiff purchased him for only £90, a French veterinary surgeon 

 having reduced the splint and given a plausible recipe for its future 

 treatment. Defendant would not give a warranty that he would stand 

 training, and hence a sale memorandum was ultimately signed stating 

 the amount and time of payment, that plaintiff was to give the defen- 

 dant £10 for each of the first five races the horse won in 1830, and 

 concluding thus — " And the said Mr. Wright does hereby warrant the 

 said horse to be sound, wind and limb, at this timey In the course of 

 six months the horse broke down in training, and an action was com- 

 menced on the warranty. Parke J. t)old the jury that the parties, by 

 the insertion of the words " at this time," probably intended to exclude 

 a warranty of the horse's standing training ; and that the question for 

 them to consider was, whether at the time of the warranty the animal 

 was sound for ordinary purposes, as to go on the road or the like, the 

 express warranty rendering the defendant responsible for the conse- 

 quences of the splint, though the defect was visible. 



The Court of Common Pleas granted a new trial, as they thought 

 that the jury might have been misled by the direction, which would 

 have been less subject to misapprehension if it had been left to them to 

 consider whether the horse was at the time of the bargain sound in 

 wind and limb, saving those manifest defects contemplated by the 

 parties. At the second trial the plaintiff brought forward evidence as 

 to the nature and consequence of various kinds of splints, and proved 

 not only that they may or may not be the efficient cause of lameness, 

 according to their size or to the position they occupy ; but that Samp- 

 son's splint was in a very bad position, as it pressed on one of the 



