CONSPIRING TO CHEAT BY SALE OF HORSES. 5 ^'9 



found at the Middlesex Sessions, and removed by cerfiorari, at the 

 instance of the defendants. It chanjed the two defendants with con- 

 spiriny to cheat and defraud one Feather stonhavgh hy false pretences as 

 to the sale of two horses, and the verdict of guilty was confirmed by the 

 Court. In his elaborate judgment on the law of false pretences, in Reg. 

 V, Bryan, Erie J. thus explained the diflerence between the two fore- 

 going cases : " Although in the case of Rex v. Pywell it was held not 

 indictaUe to praise the quality of a horse, hioivinj it not to le umihy of 

 the praise put on him, yet in the case of Reg. v. Kenrklc, as far as I 

 understand the case, for I was counsel for the man, the fact which 

 brought that case within the definition was the fact that Kenrick 

 averred that these horses had been the property of a lady deceased, 

 were now the property of her sister, and had never been the property 

 of a horse dealer, and were quiet and proper to drive. The purchaser 

 wanted those horses for a woman of his family ; the substance of the 

 contract was, that they were the property of a lady, who had driven 

 the horses, and it was a false assertion of a definite existing fact ; ' they 

 are the property of the sister now,' when they were the property of 

 another person : 'they never were the property of a horse dealer,' 

 whereas they were the property of a horse dealer, and had run away 

 and produced a fatal accident. The case of Reg. v. Kenrklc was not the 

 warranting a horse sound, as in the case of Rex v. Doddridge, but it 

 was the affirming of a false fact, which the party knew to be false, and 

 on that ground the conviction proceeded." 



His lordship also observed : "In the ordinary case of a man coming 

 up to the seller of a horse at a fair, and saying, ' Allow me to try that 

 horse,' and he rides away and sells it, if the jury are of opinion that he 

 got possession animo furandi, it is a larceny. But if he were to profess 

 to the seller of the horse, 'I like the horse, and I will pay you next 

 Monday,' and the seller says, 'I agree to that,' although the jury find 

 that he did that animo furandi, unquestionably that was not indictable 

 before stat. 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 53, which seems to make persons 

 responsible in a criminal court, where there was a contract of sale ; but 

 yet it fell within the same category of criminal intention, as the cases 

 I have adverted to, where the possession was obtained animo furandi. 

 Looking at all the cases which have been decided there, those that seem 

 to have been the subject of the greatest comment, appear to me to fall 

 within the principle, that where the substance of the contract is falsely 

 represented, and by reason of that the money is obtained, the indictment 

 is good " {ib.). 



According to Whiie v. Spettigue, an action of trover is maintainalle to 

 recover the value of goods u'hich have leen stolen from the plaintiff, and 



