INJURY OR LOSS OF CHATTELS AT INN. 601 



defendant laid an information before a magistrate for felony. The 

 plaintiff at first did not give satisfactory proof that he had purchased 

 sheep at all, and was committed for trial, but acquitted. In the 

 present trial it appeared on the balance of testimony that the sheep 

 was really one of the 17 purchased by the plaintiff' at Banbury in 

 June, and could not have been stolen from defendant m Septem- 

 ber; but still there were many facts to lead to the conclusion that 

 the sheep was not one of the 17, but one of the ten. Defendant, 

 as it appeared, laid an information merely on the advice of his 

 attorney, as being the shortest way to stop proceedings in the County 

 Court. 



Bramtvell J. told the jury that the question of malice was for them, 

 but expressed a strong opinion that they ought not on this evidence to 

 find it. He told them, that as to the question of reasonable and 

 probable cause, there seemed no doubt that defendant bona fide believed 

 it was one of his stolen sheep, and asked the jury to find as a fact 

 " whether defendant had reasonable ground for that belief ? " The jury 

 found he had ; and his Lordship ruled that there was reasonable and 

 probable cause for instituting the prosecution, and that therefore the 

 question of malice became immaterial, and directed a verdict for de- 

 fendant. A rule nisi for a new trial for misdirection was discharged 

 {Erie J. diss.). 



When chattels have deeti deposited in apullic inn, and there lost or in- 

 jured, the 2)7-imd facie presumption is that the loss or damage was 

 occasioned by the negligence of the innkeeper or his servants. But 

 this presumption may be rebutted; and if the jury find in favour of 

 the innkeeper as to negligence, he is entitled to succeed on a plea of. 

 Not guilty. Thus in Dawson v. Ghamney, where the plaintiff gave his 

 horse on a Penrith market day to an ostler, at the Bell and Bullock, 

 who placed him in the stall ivith a Icicking horse tvhicli injured him, the 

 Court held that as the defendant in his answer convinced the jury that 

 there had been all due care taken, and he got a verdict on the first 

 issue Not guilty, that proof took away the ground of action, according 

 to all the authorities, and a rule for a new trial was refused. 



In Degge v. Tucker the declaration stated that the plaintiff, at de- 

 fendant's request, deUvered to defendant, then being a livery-stable 

 keeper, a horse of the plaintiff, to be by him taken due and proper 

 care of, and to be kept in a separate stall in the defendant's stable, for 

 reward to be paid by the plaintiff in that behalf; and that the defendant 

 accepted the care and custody of the said horse upon such terms ; yet 

 he would not take due or proper or any care thereof, or keep it in a 

 separate stall, and by means of the premises the horse was so Iciclced by 



