72 NATIONAL FOREST MANUAL LAWS. 



"It is immaterial whether the fire * * * originated on private 

 land if it was set willfully and if in the course of nature and in view 

 of all the surroundings the said fire would reasonably be expected to be 

 communicated to the public domain. A man has no lawful right to 

 set fire to his own property if he has reason to believe or intends that 

 such fire will be communicated to the property of others and destroy it." 



In an action by the United States against a railroad company to 

 recover for loss of timber alleged to have been burned through defend- 

 ant's negligence in permitting inflammable material to accumulate on 

 its right of way, in which fire was started from an engine and spread 

 into the timber on a forest reservation, a letter written by a forest 

 inspector to the secretary of defendant some time before the fire, 

 inclosing a report from a ranger as to the dangerous condition of the 

 right of way, and asking that it be remedied, was not inadmissible as 

 a self -serving declaration, but was properly admitted to show actual 

 notice to defendant of the condition. referred to therein, the fact being 

 otherwise proved. (Corvallis & E. R. Co. v. United States, 191 Fed. 

 Kept., 310.) 



On an issue as to the condition of a locomotive alleged to have caused 

 a fire on defendant's right of way because of its defective condition which 

 permitted the escape of fire and sparks, the admission in evidence of 

 the testimony of the fireman of defendant's machine shop as to the 

 condition of the engine, both before the fire and after its return from 

 the trip on which the fire occurred, the purpose being to show its con- 

 dition before and at the time of the fire, was not prejudicial error. 

 (Same.) 



(Liability of railroads for injuries by fire as affected by management 

 of locomotives, see note to Woodward v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 

 75 C. A. C., 598.) 



Injunction will lie to prevent the accumulation of inflammable 

 material upon a railroad right of way within the National Forests when 

 such accumulation is shown to be dangerous to the forests. (1 Sol. Op. , 

 300, 526.) 



There is no authority in the department to make settlement with the 

 Great Northern Railway Co. of a fire trespass, by which the company 

 shall pay at once for all timber destroyed or damaged, with an agree- 

 ment that any money received from the sale of damaged timber to a 

 third party, less costs of the sale, shall be paid over to the company. 

 (1 Sol. Op., 496.) 



It is not the duty of forest officers to directly prosecute in a State 

 court -a person accused of violating a State statute by setting out a fire 

 which spread to National Forest lands. In such case they would per- 

 form their full duty by calling the attention of the proper State officers 

 to the alleged criminal offense, suggesting action and offering to aid in 

 all proper ways. (2 Sol. Op., 693.) 



The acquittal of a fire trespasser in a State court is no bar to his pros- 

 ecution in a United States court for a violation of the Federal laws 

 arising out of the same acts. (Solicitor to his Assistant at Denver, 

 Sept. 10, 1912.) 



The Government is entitled to recover for damage to reproduction 

 (United States v. Corvallis & Eastern R. R. Co., 191 Fed., 310; United 

 States v. N. P. R. R. Co., Dec. 2, 1911, in United States District Court, 

 Western District of Washington, and case of United States v. C. O. 

 Bailey, receiver for Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. and Title Guarantee Surety 

 Co., in United States District Court for South Dakota, Sept. 7, 1910), 

 the verdicts in which cases include such damage. 



GRAZING TRESPASSES. 

 [United States v. Grimaud et al., 220 U. S., 506, syllabus.] 



Under the acts establishing forest reservations, their use for grazing 

 or other lawful purposes is subject to rules and regulations established 

 by the Secretary of Agriculture, and it being impracticable for Congress 

 to provide general regulations, that body acted within its constitutional 

 power in conferring power on the Secretary to establish such rules; the 

 power so conferred being administrative and not legislative, is not an 

 unconstitutional delegation. 



