XXV111 INTRODUCTION. 



scientific dissent. It is to be so held because the balance 

 of biological authority, estimated not less in quality than 

 in quantity, has clearly pronounced in its favour; and 

 because on these two points the biologists form the final 

 court of appeal. 



But when we come to mental, moral, and social 

 questions, neither physicists nor naturalists are any 

 longer authorities, however little some of them seem 

 disposed to concede the point. In particular, when the 

 question relates to man and his behaviour under the 

 complex motive forces, conscious or unconscious, which 

 determine it (supposing the question to come at all 

 within the range of scientific methods or treatment), we 

 shall no longer refer to the physicist or the naturalist for 

 the scientific doctrine. Not to the physicist certainly, 

 whose special studies of the invariable behaviour of 

 matter or the settled sequences of physical phenomena 

 prepare him very imperfectly for the investigation of the 

 widely different phenomena presented by human con- 

 duct; nor yet to the naturalist, whose infinitely wider 

 subject of plant and animal life forbids the due concen- 

 tration of regard upon the special human subject, par- 

 ticularly on its inner conscious side. Nor need we 

 greatly care as yet to consult that new man of science, 

 the anthropologist, not at least until he has a little 

 more systematized the miscellaneous mass of facts re- 

 ferring to man in all times and climes which at present 

 forms the subject-matter of his study. 



On all questions concerning man himself, his virtues 

 and vices, and the uniformity, such as it is, which his life 

 in society presents, we are properly referred, on the part 

 of science, to a different order of specialists to the 

 psychologist, the moralist, the sociologist, to such au- 

 thorities as Mill, or Bain, or Herbert Spencer, who, in 



