INTRODUCTION. XXXV11 



itself in an aspect quite other than it does from that of 

 Science. In the two concluding chapters of the First 

 Part of this book the whole question is discussed anew, 

 and with special reference to the new scientific theories 

 which bear upon it. I have fronted the arguments of 

 science with the counter- theses of philosophy and religion, 

 supplemented by the instincts of the human heart, and I 

 have endeavoured, finally, after assigning to the several 

 arguments the degree of weight that seemed in each case 

 due, to take the fair measure of our fears as well as of our 

 hopes. 



5. As regards the scientific ethics, in addition to 

 exposition, some criticism is called for ; because, though 

 a certain agreement is apparent, one is also soon forced to 

 recognize very serious differences amongst the scientific 

 authorities ; and also because the doctrine the most ap- 

 parently well grounded does not appear wholly unexcep- 

 tionable. Thus, scientific moralists agree that the will is 

 not free, and here I agree with them ; they agree further 

 that the ultimate end of action is happiness or the lessen- 

 ing of pain ; that the proper standard of virtue or right 

 action is the amount of resulting good or happiness or 

 utility ; and with neither of these principles am I dis- 

 posed to quarrel much. But though utilitarianism is 

 thus the common ethical creed of scientific moralists like 

 Mill and Bain and Herbert Spencer, itr is by no means 

 conceived alike by all of them. The utilitarianism of 

 Mill, which places the happiness of others first, that of 

 self only second, is very different in itself and in its 

 consequences from the utilitarianism of Spencer, which 

 reverses this order ; and if the latter doctrine, backed as 

 it is by evolution, and reposing on wider and deeper 

 generalizations of the necessary laws of life, is to be held 



