INTRODUCTION. XXXIX 



be chiefly concerned; for it must be allowed that it is 

 not only more practicable, but also more scientifically 

 grounded than any previous presentment of the utili- 

 tarian creed. It is more truly rational than the famous 

 rationally deduced system of Kant, because, unlike the 

 latter, it is founded on human nature and can be followed 

 by human beings. It is better based on human nature 

 than the ethics of Butler ; more consistent than the ortho- 

 dox popular system, a compound of Butler and Kant, 

 which goes by the name of the a priori or intuitional 

 morality. But when all this has been said in its favour, 

 we have to add that there are grave objections to some 

 of its tenets, and still graver ones to its inmost spirit and 

 practical tendency. There are the most serious questions 

 raised by it ; nay, that most serious and sinister of all 

 questions, whether Virtue has any reality beyond con- 

 vention, is once more irresistibly raised by it ; and the 

 answer to the question from the evolution point of view 

 is not quite satisfactory. In fact, if virtue is not to be 

 attacked at a vital point by being resolved in the last 

 analysis into selfishness ; if morality is to be regarded as 

 other than a useful invention, to abate social jar and 

 friction ; if moral rules are not to be brought to the level 

 of police regulations ; then there are some qualifica- 

 tions or concessions that must be made by the evolution 

 moralist over and above those made by Mr. Spencer, in 

 his recent remarkable work, The Data of Ethics. 



Whatever becomes of moral systems, the practical 

 morality, the ethics to be preached and enforced on men 

 in future, must be the result of a compromise between 

 the new and old teaching ; and an attempt is made in 

 the last two chapters of the book at a partial conciliation 

 between the evolution ethics on the one side, and the 

 transcendental, intuitional, and humanitarian ethics 011 



