36 THE CREED OF SCIENCE, EELIGIOUS AND MORAL. 



in any case, no matter on what road Nature started, why 

 suppose them to have been specially conceived and 

 planned in a mind that aimed at them ? Not without 

 reason, therefore, on evolution principles, have naturalists 

 like Haeckel and Huxley so often repeated that the 

 famous argument from Final Causes to prove the existence 

 of a designing mind and maker is worthless. If Darwin's 

 hypothesis contains the truth and the whole truth, all 

 Theism is worthless, and we may burn our old Natural 

 Theologies and Bridgewater Treatises. Even the qualified 

 doctrine of Kant, that men must read teleology into 

 organic Nature, whether there be warrant for it or no in 

 her inmost structure and essence, is set aside by the new 

 and startling suggestions of science and evolution. For 

 we are shown that Nature had no special aims what- 

 ever in view ; that she could not have had any such ; 

 that the only means employed by her, namely, natural 

 selection, were capable of reaching almost any organic 

 ends ; that they did stray into uncouth and monstrous 

 forms occasionally in geologic periods ; that, in a word, 

 Nature neither knew nor cared what forms should 

 ultimately emerge from the general organic strife and 

 the attempts of individuals to better their condition. We 

 are shown that, though there were no aims in Nature, 

 yet that some kind of order must have resulted, what- 

 ever course she took, if she only persevered sufficiently 

 long in natural selection. As for the appearance of man, 

 it was no more contemplated than that of any other 

 species, nor were there any special preparations made 

 for him on his arrival to ensure a lengthened stay. He 

 came, as the rest, by the necessities of the case, in which, 

 however, chance played a conspicuous part, and when he 

 came he had to fit himself slowly, and with infinite pain 

 and effort, to his by no means happy environment. 



