ON HUMAN NATURE AND ITS CAPACITIES FOR 



the happiness of others those in 

 collision with us ; worse, even our friends. The con- 

 ditions of existence force upon man, as upon all the lower 

 animals, this self-regarding course of action, whatever 

 disagreeable results may follow to others from it ; and 

 some such is sure to result. In a word, the exigencies 

 of life compel men to act in a prescribed way as respects 

 their own interest. We must in certain cases put self- 

 interest in the narrow sense first. But what we must 

 do, that we ought to do ; or at least so to do is legitimate 

 and cannot be shown to be immoral. There is, in fact, 

 an " ought " which comes from strict physical necessity, 

 as well as an " ought " which comes from conscience, and 

 the former carries the first obligation with it. 



Life for self, then, as Herbert Spencer and many 

 moralists before him have concluded, comes first ; life for 

 others, or for humanity if the latter be a practicable as 

 it is a noble ideal can only come second. The truth 

 that man is necessarily a self-regarding animal first, and 

 a social or a sympathetic one afterwards, is forced upon 

 our attention by the facts of experience, by the universal 

 regime of competition all around. But it has been 

 brought before us in a more . deep and comprehensive 

 manner by the teaching of evolution in the writings of 

 Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, all of whom, show us that the 

 struggle for existence is the all-pervading law throughout 

 the whole animal kingdom. Everywhere they point out 

 to us this universal trial by battle, in some sense of the 

 word. Darwin, it is true, in the case of man, is some- 

 what inclined to draw a veil over the disagreeable facts 

 of this seemingly selfish struggle ; but this veil, Haeckel, 

 dissatisfied with the present course of things and social ' 

 arrangements, would boldly tear aside. He affirms the 

 everywhere selfish, pitiless, and immoral or non-moral 



