128 THE CREED OF SCIENCE, RELIGIOUS AND MORAL. 



be said to have a character only on the assumption that 

 the same motives addressed to him will cause him to act 

 always in the same constant manner. 



5. Such, in brief, is the theory of the determination 

 of the will by motives, as given by Mill and Bain. In 

 substance we accept it. But it requires a deeper and 

 more comprehensive statement to connect it with the 

 truths of evolution and physiology, with the facts of 

 heredity, and with present physiological facts, both of 

 which influence largely the motives, and are thus causes 

 of our actions. The theory requires qualification, both 

 from the point of view of physiology and from that of 

 evolution ; for we are assured that unconscious motives, 

 be they materialistic and mechanical or no, have an 

 influence, mysterious but potent, in the determination 

 of the conscious ones, which alone are recognized by Mill 

 and Bain as the causes of volition. We know, too, how 

 much of our action passes into the automatic, the 

 habitual, the mechanical, where we are as unconscious 

 of volitions as the merest machines. Further, in the 

 world of conscious motives we are certain that what 

 outwardly appears the same motive is not inwardly 

 judged by us to be so, from some change in us ; that our 

 conscious feelings, by which we must measure all motives, 

 are treacherous and uncertain scales in many cases ; that 

 there may be such a thing as a change in character, 

 amounting to revolution, in a comparatively short time ; 

 and that such change may affect our old motives in very 

 unequal degrees, annihilating some and intensifying 

 others; that besides revolution in character, there is 

 always evolution or development up to a certain time of 

 life ; and that in age a reverse process of decay sets in. 

 We feel at times like Lucretius, as if some mighty and 

 malign but invisible hand had seized our will (or what 



