140 THE CREED OF ^SCIENCE, RELIGIOUS AND MORAL. 



10. Why, then, are men punished for actions in- 

 jurious to others or to society, when they only act from 

 the strongest motives ? If the strongest motive or sum 

 of motives invariably prevails and carries the volition 

 with it, it is still a matter of chance whether the motives 

 are good or bad ones, though, if bad or anti-social, we 

 must necessarily act from them. Am I not compelled to 

 act from the strongest motive as irresistibly as a steam- 

 engine is urged forward by the mechanical forces anima- 

 ting it ? and if compelled, are not merit and demerit 

 alike removed ? Why, then, should I be punished if the 

 consequences of my action should happen to harm others ? 

 W T hy on any ground except the superior might of society 

 and not on grounds of justice ? 



And the answer to such an objection usually urged 

 against the motive theory is as follows : " Doubtless you 

 must always decide and act according to the strongest 

 motive which for the time being is before you, unless 

 you postpone your decision in order to allow other motives 

 to rise to view ; but in either case there was supposed to 

 have been present and included in your general circle of 

 motives sitting in council, some degree of conscience, some 

 regard for the rights, and if not also some small desire 

 for the good of others, at least no wish to do them harm. 

 Further, even if all these good motives were absent, still 

 a fear of punishment was very confidently calculated 

 upon by society as being present in your case, as in all 

 cases, amongst the other motives, to warn you off from 

 actions hurtful to society. Some of these motives, pro- 

 hibitory of injurious action to others, and very particularly 

 the dread of punishment, were assumed as having been 

 present to your mind as to all properly constituted 

 minds ; and if unhappily they were not present in due 

 strength, if they were present but were not felt sufficiently 



