ON FREE-WILL, AND MAN'S AUTOMATISM. 143 



punishment had no power of acting on the will, it would 

 be illegitimate, however natural might be the inclination 

 to inflict it. Just so far as the will is supposed free, 

 that is, capable of acting against motives, punishment is 

 disappointed of its object and deprived of justification." * 

 The final justification of punishment is the greater 

 good to be attained, only by its infliction. It cannot be 

 justified on grounds of vengeance, or of retaliation, or of a 

 desire to inflict pain. The reformation of .the individual 

 and the larger good of society are the aims of punish- 

 ment, but the latter is so much the more important that 

 the former must give way to it in all cases where the 

 two are incompatible, as in the case of the murderer, 

 whose life is dangerous to the community. The aim of 

 punishment is the prevention of crime, sometimes the 

 improvement of the individual. The further question 

 arises before it can be justified Is it efficacious to its 

 end ? Does it prevent crime or improve the offender ? 

 And there can be no doubt what the answer should be. 

 There is no doubt of the efficacy of punishment in 

 general, sometimes for the improvement of the indi- 

 vidual, but far more for the prevention of future crimes. 

 There can be no question that the fear of punishment 

 prevents innumerable crimes of all kinds which nothing 

 but such fear would prevent. Without going the length 

 of Professor Bain, who affirms that "punishment or 

 retribution in some form is one-half the motive power 

 to virtue in the very best of human beings, while it is 

 more than three-fourths in the mass of mankind," we 

 have no doubt at least that the fear of punishment sits 

 as a constant monitor and motive force in the general 

 assembly of the criminal's motives. There can be no 

 question that the dread of punishment is " very potent 

 * Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 576. 



