372 THE FUTURE OF RELIGION AND MORALS. 



almost believed in by its first inventors, and justified by 

 the disbeliever on account of its necessity for restraining 

 the selfishness, and breaking in the boundless passions of 

 the individuals composing the more primitive social 

 organizations. 



And now, if such were the true earthly origin of 

 Virtue, the supposed offspring and " darling child " of 

 Jove ; and if her essence at bottom to-day in no way 

 belies her selfish and utilitarian origin, as the teaching of 

 Spencer and Darwin implies, then the question is raised, 

 how can Conscience justify her present pretensions to be 

 the absolute ruler of conduct ? For that she now has, 

 and legitimately has, such pretensions, is maintained no 

 less in the amended utilitarianism of Spencer than in the 

 high transcendental morality of Kant, or the modified 

 English intuitional morality. It is maintained, but it is 

 not explained. Again, if to assign the origin be to mark 

 the limits and sphere of morality, as the evolution ethics 

 seems to imply, how is it that Virtue has so far tran- 

 scended alike her selfish and social origin ? Still more, 

 why should she aspire to do so ? Why should she not 

 confine herself to the earth, from which she sprang ? why 

 should she aspire ever to grander ideal heights, to a purer 

 justice, to a more perfect and diffused truth, to a greater 

 good embracing ever greater numbers ? If selfishness lie 

 essentially at the root of life and conduct, we should 

 naturally expect it ought still to show itself in the grown 

 flower of the most developed conduct. But does it do so ? 

 Is there not self-forgetting and self-sacrificing conduct in 

 spite of the evolutionist's picture of the eternal and 

 necessary struggle for existence ? There is truly, but the 

 fact has not been explained by the theory, nor can it 

 easily be explained. 



For even if social and disinterested sentiments have 



