376 THE FUTUKE OF EELIGION AND MORALS. 



And does it not follow, from this account of 

 that the thief or burglar is justified in taking, if he is 

 able by force or fraud, from a society composed only of 

 selfish atoms and reposing only on the fact of possession 

 and might, that which he deems necessary for self-pre- 

 servation the first and strongest and most pressing- 

 obligation, on the showing of the evolutionist ? Further, 

 is it not evident that neither truth nor justice will be 

 striven for very ardently in a society which adopts such 

 a benumbing moral faith, as Herbert Spencer himself is 

 inclined to admit, if not to approve of ? * Why, indeed, 

 should they, if the pursuit of such visionary ideals in- 

 volves costly personal effort, perhaps sacrifice, and the 

 destruction of self the centre and end of all our actions ? 

 In a word, with the evolution origin for morals, no moral 

 obligation remains. There remains only the obligation 

 of interest; for the individual the primary obligation 

 to exist, and to attend to the interest of self to the 

 utmost extent within the limits of law and conventional 

 opinion : and for society the primary obligation to 

 defend its own existence and interests, including its own 

 imperfections, however opposed they may be to truth, 

 justice, and the greater good both of itself and of future 

 society. 



And the feeling of duty, what is it, on this showing, 

 but a noble delusion, of which, whenever it presses 

 heavy on us or prescribes arduous 'or dangerous service, 

 we, as prudent and sensible persons, may conveniently rid 

 ourselves ? And a nice sense of honour, what is it more 

 than a sense of duty, when duly weighed in the scales of 

 the evolution ethics ? It is a word, a thing of air, " a 

 trim reckoning," possessed by him " who died o' Wednes- 

 day," as Falstaff described the other honour related to 



* Study of Sociology, p. 402. 



