PARTIAL CONCILIATION OF THE NEW AND OLD ETHICS. 389 



to hasten the reign of justice and the bringing in of 

 righteousness on the earth. These are doubtless large 

 limitations and abatements of the absolute aims of the 

 idealist ; but science to-day, as in the days of Aristotle, 

 and with stronger reasons, insists on our having regard 

 to the categories of time, place, and persons, to the 

 considerations of possibility and suitability in our moral 

 endeavours. 



Men can always do something, by word and equitable 

 deed, for the cause of justice ; at a favourable moment 

 possibly more; but it is only on great spirits specially 

 elected, and on the rare occasion of a great opportunity 

 presented, that the high duty may devolve of striking 

 their strongest for the cause of justice without regard to 

 cost or consequence. At important moments in the life 

 of nations, in certain great crises in human affairs, in 

 great reformations or revolutions, the great man, who 

 is also the just, whether statesman, reformer, soldier, 

 writer, is called upon to speak and act in bolder and 

 more decisive manner. But all are not called to this 

 high service, nor yet the greatest spirits, save at the 

 fitting hour. To the thinker belongs the elaboration 

 of the growing idea of the just; on all men it is in- 

 cumbent to act justly in the common relations and 

 intercourse of life; but to strive after a more compre- 

 hensive establishment of the ideal of justice in our still 

 unjust world, is only asked of the great men, the masters 

 of affairs and of action, and from them only when the 

 fulness of time has come, when, indeed, they may call 

 upon the rest to strongly second their efforts. Within 

 these limits the claims of the moral idealist in behalf of 

 justice must be reduced. 



In like manner with regard to our duty to truth. If 

 we are haply the chosen depositaries of important and 



