[ 7 ] 



which regulate them " (Analyt. Prior. I. 30). He 

 seems to have been the first to teach clearly that the 

 so-called " deceptions of the senses" are only false de-' 

 ductions from sense impressions, which in themselves 

 are not deceptive (De Anima, III. 3, etc.), though 

 the same thing seems to have been dimly perceived 

 by some earlier thinkers. 



Among the Stoics who flourished in the third 

 century B.C., Zeno, the founder of the school, seems 

 to have been satisfied with the general statement that 

 reason is the test of truth. His successor, Chrysippus, 

 took as his criterion TTJV /cara\7rrt,Kr}v <f>avTO(Tiav ; 

 which has been translated as " the sensuous appre- 

 hension." The phrase was adopted by the school, 

 but different members appear to have understood it 

 in rather different senses. It is, they said, " an im- 

 pression on the mind," and Clean thes compared it to 

 the impression of a seal upon wax ; while Chrysippus 

 himself called the impression a mojification of the 

 mind comparable to the modification of the air by 

 sound. This comparison would appear to the Greeks 

 especially appropriate, because their whole language 

 was based on the idea that the mind (or soul) was in 

 its nature gaseous (conf. Trvevfjua K.T.\.). The difficulty 

 about the " sensuous apprehension " is that in order 

 to give true results it must correspond to the real 

 external object, otherwise hallucinations would give 

 truth of the same kind as other sensations. The 

 Stoics, however, held to their new criterion, and 



pTP 



, TH 

 or 



