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But when the question as to the good faith of 

 the witness has been decided there remains another 

 most important question to be considered, entirely 

 distinct from the former, namely, are the syntaxes 

 involved in the evidence the clearest and most 

 direct which are possible for us ? The mere state- 

 ment of the question in this form implies the 

 scientific criterion ; but of course the usual form 

 of statement is quite different. I think that the 

 customary inquiries concerning evidence may fairly be 

 put into the typical forms: "Is the witness telling 

 the truth ? " And, " If he tells us what is not true, 

 is this done intentionally, or by mistake ? " Now 

 if truth be supposed to represent some correspond- 

 ence, hitherto inexplicable, between ideas and an 

 external reality independent of our senses, and if 

 it be farther supposed that men are somehow able, 

 normally, to discover such truth ; then what is 

 true for one man is true for all men at all times, 

 and any one whose opinion diverges from this 

 truth may be said to make a mistake, for he falls 

 away from a fixed normal standard according to 

 which there should be no mistake. Upon such a 

 theory, that form of question regarding evidence 

 which is the most usual would also be the simplest 

 and most direct. If, however, truth, in matters of 

 science, be nothing else than the clearest available 

 syntax of all the reminiscences which can be found 

 to relate to the matter in hand, then . that which 



