346 
friendship, consanguinity, or bounty, assistance in times 
of general difficulty and danger. The government esta- 
blished by the United Provinces in the reign of Philip 
IIT. of Spain, by America in 1782, and, proud reflection ! 
by Great Britain herself in 1688, may be quoted as fur- 
ther examples, in which this direct and expressly conven- 
tional consent of the people was exercised. 
’ But as the theory of Filmer was fated to fall before 
the opposition of Sidney and Locke, so the system which 
these distinguished men had set up in its stead, was, in 
its turn, exposed to an attack, which, if less efficacious, 
proceeded notwithstanding from a quarter not less re= 
spectable. About the middle of the last century, Mr 
Hume and some other writers undertook to shew, that 
the doctrine of the consent cf the people, as the only 
basis of legitimate government, was altogether errone- 
ous and visionary. ; 
If it be meant, said they, that the contract, implied 
or direct, between the sovereign and the people, is 
the agreement by which men in ‘a savage state form 
the social union, and from which every communi- 
ty is originally derived, we admit the accuracy of 
the fact, but deny its obligation on men in the advanced 
stages of society: Every government that has endured 
for any period, has undergone the most entire changes 
since its first establishment; nor can a consent or vo- 
luntary acquiescence, which was given some centuries 
ago, be binding under a totally different aspect of the 
political arrangement. . 
- Again, in those instances, they further observed, which 
seem the most favourable to the doctrine of the consent 
of the people, the real exercise of the right has been alte- 
gether imperfect or illusory. In the most perfect and ex- 
tensive republics of antiquity, nota tenth part of the peo- 
ple voted either for the original establishments, or on 
the enactment of any subsequent law ; and even at the 
boasted Revolution of 1688 itself; the Prince of Orange 
‘was Nei 2 over, and seated on the throne, by a meré 
junto of the English people. But, it was further said, 
if, even in these instances, the principle has in fact no 
place, how much less shall we find it realized:in any of 
the other governments, which either actually exist, or 
which history has recorded? In perhaps all of them, 
it is not difficult to trace the sovereign authority to 
conquest, usurpation, donation by testament, or some 
other mode of fraud’ or’ violence. | Hereditary descent 
prevails the most generally ; yet it would be bold'to 
affirm that none of these governments were lawful,’ or 
that the people were never sensible of any obligation to 
submit to their authority. In fine, «though an appeal,” 
says Mr Hume, in the concluding part of his Essay on’ 
the Original Contract, «though an appeal'to general 
be remo may justly, in the speculative sciences of meta~ 
physics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be deemed 
unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard 
to morals, ‘as well as criticism, there is really‘no other 
standard by which any controversy can ever be decided; 
and nothing is a clearer proof that a theory of this 
kind is erroneous, than to find that it leads to paradoxes 
repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and 
to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. 
The —— which founds all lawful government on 
an original contract, or consent of the people; is plain 
of this kind ; nor has the most notedef ite irs. s, % 
prosecution of it, scrupled to affirm, that absolute mo« 
narchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be 
no form of civil government at all, and that the sua 
GOVERNMENT. - 
eme power ina state, cannot take from any man by taxes 
re depioitstins on part of his property, Re dr 
consent, or that of his representatives.* authority,” 
continues Mr Hume, “ any moral reasoning can have 
which leads into opinions so wide of the general:prac- 
tice of mankind in every place but this single king- 
dom, it is easy to determine.” Cogs se 
In the remarks which we have already made, when. 
detailing what we conceive to be the just and fair state 
of the doctrine of the pire oe of the people, we have 
already, perhaps, anticipated the proper answer tosome — 
of it T objentidnies We shall, therefore, only very 
briefly take further notice of them. orients 
1. It would be improper to say, that so candid amind 
as Mr Hume’s is represented to have been, has in« 
tentionally oh pas the doctrines of sakeapee em 
that so t a philosophér was not always r to dis= 
cover crati whether with his. ae political 
opinions or not. Yet we cannot but think, that the. 
careful peruser of Mr Locke’s book, can have no diffi-, 
culty in reconciling the pa in question to the “ ge-. 
neral practice of mankind.” » For it is most obvious, as 
well frorn the whole scope of the work, as from the un= 
deniable and notorious nature of the facts themselves, 
that Mr Locke could never mean to deny the actuat 
existence of absolute monarchy in the world, or that the 
supreme power in a state did not often actually take 
part of a man’s property without his. own consent, or 
that of his representatives. It is plain that: he only. 
meant to affirm, that,absolute monarchy was inconsist~. 
ent with such a state of society, as, from its internal 
security, and the innumerable advan thence: ari« 
sing, might with propriety be termed civil; and that 
the supreme power in a state could not lawfully take 
any part of a man’s property without his own consent, _ 
or that of his ntatives. Indeed; the opposers of 
this doctrine seem always to have taken it for granted, 
that its advocates maintained its applicability to all the 
different governments which have ever actually appear= 
ed in the’ world.» Neither was Locke nor Si so! 
little conversant with the history of mankind, as not 
to know the various sources of fraud and violence from. 
which political establishments had, in point of fact, too 
often proceeded. All that meant to affirm was, that 
no government could be regarded as lawful, that is, exer~ 
cising its functions upon any obligatory principle, where: 
the unequivocal, though it a be tacit, consent of the’. 
le actually existing under it, was not interposed. © 
es It is mes habits hind of the instances in which — 
the consent of the people was most directly exercised, 
did it arise from ‘the universal suffrage, or even, per= 
haps, from a fair and totally unbiassed majority of the 
people. It is sufficient if this conventional consent was: 
given in as perfect a manner, or as nearly so, as the na 
ture and structure of human society will admit.. An 
abstractedly perfect expression of the consentis 
impossible. Nor can beaccused of supporting’an ile — 
lusory principle, who would rest the legitimacy of govern- 
ment upon that consent of the people which is 
ed by such a majority as, from the very nature of socie~ 
ty, itis reasonable to'expect, or practicable to obtain. 
3. We t that it is impossible, ‘in every instance, 
or precise perio Po YW of the 
people may be considered ‘as fully and unequivocally, 
expressed, or to distinguish between that: nt con= 
sent which a tyrant or usurper may exact; and that’ 
which is voluntary,and free. But the principle is not, . 
therefore, the less real. Pirates, or banditti, may seize 
* « Locke on Government, chap. vii sect, 90.” Nae tap 
