ug! gpa es 
GRAMMAR. 
worl ing in their separate state-no idea that is new, we com- 
icate information to one another, and exercise an 
on human opinions. On this office of lan- 
depends the whole benefit which mankind de- 
ome the ap codeeys eit oo 
Engrossed by varie om application of Jan- 
guage, authors have been induced ie consider it as 
consisting entirely in assertion ; that is, in expressing 
the connection of one idea with another, and conveyin 
by these means new information. But, it may be call 
in — how far this account is strictly applicable 
toa er aes ene be trusted for our guidance in 
tracin steps of ite earliest history. oa 
It been hastily assumed, that lan arises 
from an original and universal inclination -our 
thoughts gratuitously to one another. From this cause 
“* it has sometimes been erroneously concluded that it is 
nothing else than a faithful transcript of the successions 
of human thought. This, however, is not its character. 
A man does not speak simply because he thinks. It is not 
anecessary result of the ion of a thinking faculty, 
nor does the inclination to speak regularly accompany 
its a It is the effect ofa range of thoughts 
which must be considered as limited when compared to 
the whole phenomena of mind. Speech, like every other 
voluntary act of man, is founded on the presence of par- 
ticular motives. It originates in his social nature taking 
advan’ of his social state; and it depends on the 
know which each has of various links of connec- 
tion existing betwixt himself and other thinking be- 
it is not naturalto man tocommunicateall his thoughts. 
therefore, that a complete analysis of the 
origin it were in our possession, this would not 
necessarily bring along with it a perfect theory of the 
origin and character of age ; nor would the most 
perfect hi of the formation of language lead us in 
the popula! adeliantt a perfect analysis of the nature: 
; t. 
But, | ing that we do not by means of lan e 
erenam aie. Soa thoughts, Hew make a ecledtie 
among them suited to our'several occasions, it might still 
be contended that we do nothing else by means of lan« 
guage than communicate our thoughts; that this is its 
universal office ; and that this position might be as- 
sumed as fundamental in entering on the subject of uni- 
versal Grammar. 
Some considerations will, we eonceive, warrant us inhe- 
sitating before we concede even this point. We shall not 
stop to enquire if there is any acceptation in which this 
theory is true ; but it is certainly susceptible of a mean- 
Sssedicane panamiiea which has tended in some 
cases to distort philological iry. On the supposi- 
tion now mentioned, lan: 40 ree still be considered 
as an exhibition of human thought.* 
first observation which we have to make en: 
this account of the subject is, that, if it were correct, 
language ought always to have a definite reference to 
our sentiments, and t in fact to express them with 
fidelity. But we find whien we desire a person to. 
perform any act, our motives for it are kept out of view, 
and are not intended to be contemplated by the indi- 
vidual spoken to. ‘The motives which are expected to. 
Operate on him are ideas of a different sort which we 
endeavour to excite. Even in the use of the plainest 
affirmations, we do not necessarily exhibit our own 
893 
thoughts. We may excite a completely the re- Universal 
verse of them. This is always 
cure reception toa false proposition. The thought von- 
veyed by our words has indeed been revolved in the 
mind as a contrivance for operating on another, In 
that other, however, we mean to produce a particular 
belief. This is certainly a thought ; yet it is not the be-~ 
lief, consequently not the thought, which, in so far as 
truth is concerned, we ourselves entertain. 
It might indeed be replied, that this employment of 
language is unnatural; that it is as much a deviation 
from its ee poe: in the right use of our facul- 
ties, as any act of drivelling folly committed by means 
of language, whieh ought not to be regarded as enterin, 
into its original character. But it is to be remem 
that this use of age, though disingenuous, is still 
characteristic of intellect and address. 
e case when we pro- Grammar 
—_— 
It might also be said that in this use of language we The pretext 
closely imitate the sentences in which our own ideas are for language 
h 
fact 
language in its structure. But its object must im- 
ply the real motives of the speaker. This account of 
it, therefore, must be deficient. If we can form a ge- 
neral theory on the subject which will embrace these 
as well as all other oceasions on which it is used, a ma- 
terial advantage will undoubtedly be obtained. 
The existence of false sentences is not our only 
reason for declining to regard the communication of 
thought, at least t communication. which consists 
in assertion, as the universal office of language. We 
shall find that Imperative sentences cannot, without great 
awkwardness, be reduced to affirmations or communica- 
tions of our knowledge: But, reserving that argument 
for the next Chapter, we shall now endeavour to unfold, 
in a more detailed manner, some of the intricacies in 
which this part of the subject is involved. 
Different circumstances concur to impress 
losophical inquirer with an idea that the communica- t 
tion of our thoughts is the object of lan . One, at 
which we have already hinted, is, that this communica- 
tion is the object of a great part of language, perhaps 
by far the greatest. is is most especially the case in 
polished and literary communities. It is the object of 
the greater part of the language of men of philosophical 
habits, the only persons who concern themselves with 
analytical inquiries on’ the subject ; and it recommends 
itself as exhibiting the most phe oe species of influ- 
ence which language has ex on society. 
There are also some particulars in which all human 
speech $ with the office of communicating thought, 
and which have led to an acquiescence in that account 
of ite general object. One is, that the use of it always: 
proceeds. from some thoughts existing in the mind. 
Another is, that lan; consists of the signs of thought. 
A third, that the thoughts corresponding to these signs 
are contemplated by the individual using them. And 
the last is, that terminates in exciting thou, 
in the person addressed. But, though these’points of eo- 
incidence are real, a closer attention will, we think; cone 
vince our readers that they do not. of themselves con- 
stitute a communication of our thoughts. 
The mere circumstance sina the ney beret —— 
guage is in every instance the effect of previous thought 
is by no-means peculiar to this department of human 
-* For a more varied illustration of this and some other views nearly coinciding with those which are here expressed, we refer to a paper on 
‘*thetheory of language” contained in the 6th volume of the Transactions of the 
VOL..X, PART IL. 
Royal Society of prt 
nr communicated, and that our success in false- different 
depends on the closeness of this imitation. This “om #* 
etily shows that dissimulation does not ‘affect °’°™ 
the phi- A more par- 
state- 
