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Universal parts of speech, some‘of the hurtful effects of the opinion 
Grammar. entertained, by grammarians, that the history. of lan- 
guage implies a history of human knowledge and 
thought. Condillac maintains that languages are ana- 
lytic methods, and are necessary both for giving an 
account of our thoughts to our own minds, and con- 
ducting us to ideas which otherwise we could not shave 
possessed, He thinks that the investigation of them 
furnishes us with convenient means for the analysis of 
thought, and he conceives it a radical mistake to regard 
them merely as the instruments of communication, Con- 
formably with this notion, that author, like many others, 
considers the different parts of speechas expressions for 
different kinds of thoughts....We hope gradually. to 
exhibit, in the sequel of this.article, an ample collection 
of facts in refutation of these opinions.. We shall, in 
the mean time, illustrate their fallacy, by pointing out 
the fallacious character of the metaphysical speculations 
with which, as applied to the noun, they have been as- 
sociat 
—_——— 
founded on 
erroneous 
views of lan- 
guage, 
Are nouns, : : 
or sub- of substances. The word.‘‘ substance,” is derived from 
stantives,the s¢j and stare, because they, are considered as beings ex- 
names of | isting under the qualities perceived by the senses, and 
ats eine giving these qualities support, It is granted by every 
person who endeavours to go a step farther back in this 
speculation, that the nature of a substance, as separate 
from its qualities, and which ;metaphysicians, for the 
sake of distinction, denominate-a substratum, is un- 
known. Notwithstanding this, ‘such words as “ stone,” 
“ earth,” ‘* wood,” and “‘iron,’’ are regarded not,as the 
names of particular instances. and forms, of hardness, 
weight, visibility, colour, and. other qualities which’are 
perceived, but of substrata which possess these qualities, 
Doctrine of © Some grammarians, following a similar theory, have 
the French represented the distinction betwixt substantives and ad- 
gramma- jectives as having for its foundation, a difference exist- 
TiaDse ing in nature betwixt things and, their manner of ex- 
istence. Things are: said to be substances which exist 
by themselves, but the manner of existence of things is 
said to form accidents which only exist in consequence 
of the existence of substances. This is the opinion ad- 
vanced by the authors of the Grammaire Generale et 
Raisonnée. Words which signify the objects of thought 
are, in that work, diinpelistied into: those which sig- 
nify substances, and which are substantives, and those 
which signify accidents, and contain at the same time 
a notification that there is some substance to which these 
accidents belong. These last words are adjective nouns, 
or, to express each by a single word, the former are call- 
ed nouns and the latter adjectives. 
It is, however, an obvious fact with regard to nouns, 
that many of them are the names of qualities. Such are 
the nouns, ‘ hardness,” ‘ blackness,” and“ whiteness,” 
which have as much the character of substantives in 
their use in language as the words, ‘ iron;” “ wood,’? 
and. “ stone.’? 
Explana- In order to surmount this difficulty, these have been 
tions of this regarded. as a secondary or improper kind of substan- 
fact, tives, and the ideas expressed by them as not original- 
ly entitled to be expressed in that form, They have 
been considered as originating in. a figure of speech 
by which qualities are treated as if they were substan- 
ces, The authors of the last mentioned Grammar inge- 
niously attempt to solve the difficulty, by describing the 
qualities thus designated as subsisting by themselves in 
language, being so used as'to have no need. of another 
noun, although they are, in their own nature, mere 
accidents, A very little more inquiry would have led 
these writers to the true doctrine on the subject, that 
Nouns 
sometimes 
the names of 
qualities, 
GRAMMAR. : 
Substantive nouns have been considered as the names_ 
the mode of: treating the sign of an Ini 
itself by means of it, in language, is the sole founda- S* 
tion of the peculiarities of the substantive noun. — 
The difference betwixt a substance and its qualities, of 
and the whole doctrine of a substratum, seem tobe trine o 
mere assumptions of an excessively inquisitive. spe. subst 
cies of philesophy...The only, real of 
knowledge are qualities. It is vain to» tell us that , 
the qualities are merely. the media by which we 
obtain a knowledge of the. substance: Our ideas 
the qualities themselves are clear and precise ;_ 
a 
we never find that our knowledge of them conducts 
us one step towards the know of the substratum, 
The doctrine of the existence of 
the —- which we call substances ought to be con- 
sidered as consisting entirely of definite assemblages of 
ny) nding has no access. But 
we must have some intelligible description before we — 
can entertain any idea of it, and we must have some 
roof of its existence before we can reasonably be- 
eve in it. If any person. should assert that every yi doc. 
particle of earth contains a miniature of the planetary trine n 
system, we should understand his .meaning, and it pro 
would not be in our power to disprove his assertion, 
But we should. suntlerbendie sopact it as unsupported 
by evidence, and ascribe the belief of it on his part to 
extreme credulity, a ion for or some ’ 
other of the sources carlialonatinns by which menare __. 
so often misled. someones of a material substra- 
tum is not merely destitute of proof; it is unintelligi- ana ey 
ble. The word is pronounced without any SpPrOpeaie ani 
meaning. It is not probable that a notion of this sort ble. 
obtains among mankind at large. It is probable that 
the vulgar never think of any substratum containing 
the sensible qualities which they perceive, and that / 
their ideas of matter are restricted to qualities which ~ 
are the solid and real objects of their knowledge. The — 
doctrine of a substratum, has been invented by men 
in quest of subtleties; and it seems to have been 
supported by the other error already mentioned, that 
the structure of language exhibits an..analytical view 
of our thoughts, and that different kinds of thoughts 
must be expressed where different kinds of words are 
used. Man is liable, in such inquiries, to give way toa 
precipitate curiosity, which. leads him to frame hypo- 
theses on subjects beyond his reach. He does not re~ 
pose in his actual discoveries, but labours to account 
for what he knows ;, and, rather. than leave, this unat- 
tempted, he explains what he really knows by some- 
thing which he does not know, and thus infallibly ren- 
ders it more. obscure... He Hpegines that he obtains so- 
lutions of his difficulties, while he only indulges.a con= 
fused and mystic feeling associated with use of 
particular words,, vr Ibn ie hah 
When seyeral qualities are observed to be constantly Qualit 
united in. nature, a strong association is formed anne py ee 
our ideas. of such qualities; but if we make a caref edge. , 
analysis of mental PS Pet AA we shall find that, in pro~ 
nouncing the name of jany material being, certain sen~ 
sible qualities, more or less vaguely conceived, are the 
only objects of our thoughts, + salty # 
This dissertation on our ideas of substances may ap-, 
pear a deviation from. the subject of Universal ae ~ 
mar. But, since grammarians have snpposed these ideas 
to be closely connected with the theory of nouns, it 
which the human 
. 
