402 
Universal’ each other, may also in some respects differ ; and how- 
Grammat. ever nearly they may coincide, they are always distinct 
~~" facts in the mind. When two ideas of the same exter- 
Allideas. nal. object entertained at different times are placed 
of objects; _ together and called one idea, this idea is general in its 
mmonesen’* nature. Thus proper names have not such a steadiness 
particular. +) the ideas which they excite as has been ascribed to 
them... We shall further find that the ideas attached at 
any particular moment to a general term, are not so 
yague as has been supposed, They ‘have a distinct 
character ; they form a definite affection or state of mind, 
and that state of mind is a particular or individual fact. 
Individuality, however, as relating to the idea in the 
mind, does not.form the foundation of any sort of words, 
because words are understood from time to time, and 
are considered:as retaining the same meaning indepen- 
dently of the fluctuations of human thought. The 
foundation of this supposed constancy is, that the ideas 
attached to. them have always a mutual similarity. 
They differ from one another, but this difference has its 
bounds both in proper names and general terms. The 
ideas attached at different times to proper names differ 
aecording to the situations and aspects in which objects 
are viewed, and according as the mind takes in the 
whole, or only a part of any object represented. It is 
evident that the ideas attached to general terms are sub- 
jected to the very same variations. They are also liable 
to variations peculiar to themselves, arising from the dis- 
similarities subsisting among individuals of the same 
genus. This cause of diversity seems to have been 
exclusively attended .to in the inquiries instituted 
into the subject of general terms. Yet it is not always 
greater than the other. In some instances it has no ef- 
fect, This takes place wherever these diversities are 
so slight or so void of interest as to escape observation. 
‘Such are the differences betwixt one fly, one swallow, 
-or one mouse and another. The general terms applied 
‘to these objects excite no. greater variety of ideas than 
is liable to be excited by the proper names of individu- 
als belonging to the respective species. It is of im- 
portance now to:remark, that even general words sig- 
nificant of classes of beings among which prominent 
distinctions exist, along with the similarities which 
form the foundation of the aetees application of the 
words, are to be considered as retaining from time 
to time the same meaning, because the ideas which 
they excite are variable only within certain bounds. 
Some definite idea is therefore strictly attached to each 
term. This may be considered as a detached thought, 
in\sofaras it may be made the only, or at least the lead- 
ing, object of attention. We may think of the objects 
signified by any term as one genus, and investigate 
their common properties. The versatile nature of the 
human mind. makes it prone to mingle its ideas of 
these properties with various others, and these others 
are for the most part such as are combined with the cha- 
racter of the genus to form particular individuals. But 
the general property may be principally thought of, as 
well as solely designated. 
Generdl With regard to the opinion of those who allow the 
ideas do“ €Xistence of general ideas, yet maintain that they owe 
not arise their existence to the formation of general terms, it 
from words. seems to us completely incongruous. A term is invent- 
ed for the purpose of expressing an idea. ‘The recog- 
nizance of a resemblance among a plurality of individu- 
als is the foundation of a general idea, and this always 
exists before any general term is invented, and before 
any term which was formerly a proper name receives 
a generic application. 
In another 
sense gene- 
ral, 
The ideas 
attached to 
both kinds 
of nouns 
subject to 
variations 
which have 
their limits. 
GRAMMAR. 
The resemblances among objects have various degrees’ 
of extent. Some genera are much more com: sive © 
than others. Some include subordinate divisions into 
more limited genera. The word genus as techni- Deg 
cally used in the arrangements of natural hi , Ye- & 
presents one stage of subdivision: those immediatel; 
subordinate to it are called ies. If it is found con- 
venient to subdivide these, subdivisions are called 
sub-species or varieties. Those which are more .com« 
prehensive than genera are called orders. Others still 
more comprehensive are called classes. ‘The most 
neral division of all is. into Aingdoms, called the ani« 
mal, the vegetable, and the mineral kingdom. — 
In the greater part of objects, however, the resem- 
blances pass gradually into one another. One object 
resembles many others, each in different respects and 
in different degrees, Every point of resemblance and of 
difference has a generic name, because many exemplifi- 
cations of allofthemoccur. In consequence of the end+ yh. , 
less variety of existing combinations, we may designate a plication 
particular object by enumerating the general properties gen 
which meet in it to form its character. Itisthus that we ©U™S¢ 
describe either a limited species or a single individual. (7% 
This may be done without giving it an appropriate name. Jarity 
We never pursue a system of classification to its ute scripti 
most extent, so as to give characters to all the subdivi- 
sions that might be formed. However near we have 
brought any two objects together by the limitations of 
our specific characters, it is still possible to find out some 
circumstance in which they differ, either in their intrinsic 
nature or their external relations ; and, if upon this, in 
union with their other characters, we were to establish 
a term in our subdivisions, the gradations would be so - 
much extended as to become equally numerous with 
individuals. Thus classification would produce no com= 
pendiousness of plan, It would give rise to as many 
names as there are individuals, besides encumbering us 
with the names of all the subdivisions. But we have 
no motives for ing in this manner. In most 
instances, the peculiarities of individuals, or of very li 
mited species, do not sufficiently interest us. When 
excite occasional interest, they are designated as possess 
ing certain specific assemb of qualities e 
general terms, and our descriptions are aided by the em- 
loyment of clear references. To desi the . 
fies of interesting genera, species, and individusle rs a 
great part of the object of written language. It often 
happens that not only sentences but s are made 
subservient to the description of one object. Many 
others are indeed introduced for illustrating the relations 
sustained by the pets bat relations which undoubt- 
edly constitute part of the character of these others, and 
more or less promote the elucidation of all. 
The terms which designate single qualities are al- Names 
ways general. The cause of this feature in is single g 
worthy of investigation, The fact itself has given rise lities al 
to an idea, that single qualities are not individuals; that &°"® 
they are mere modes applicable to different individual 
stibstances ; or that, if each quality is an universal indi« 
vidual, it is moveable in its relations with other quali- 
ties. But single qualities, wherever they come under, 
our knowledge, are in reality different yin 
The whiteness of snow, and the whiteness of ble 
linen, are different objects. The whiteness of one piece 
of linen is a separate object from the whiteness of ano-« 
ther. It is the similarity, more or less , of the 
objects in all instances of whiteness, gives rise to 
the general name of the colour; and it is for no other 
reason that one common name is given to concrete 
