Greece. 
——— 
Farther 
successes of 
the Greeks. 
Divisions 
among 
themselves. 
468 
rarely fail of ultimate success. The Persian war, in- 
deed, was not yet terminated. The Greeks, in their 
turn, became the assailants and invaders. They pre- 
pared to protect the Ionians, who had thrown off the 
Persian yoke, and particularly to restore freedom to 
those Grecian cities in which the Persians had left gar- 
risons. Under the Spartan goes Pausanias, but es- 
pecially under Cimon the Athenian, they cafried their 
victorious arms to Byzantium, to the island of Cyprus, 
and even into Egypt. By a double victory gained on 
the river Eurymedon, under the last mentioned com- 
mander, both over the fleet and army of Persia on the 
same day, its naval strength was so broken, and its 
land forces so disheartened, that offensive operations 
against Greece were totally intermitted ; and it became 
the boast of the Grecian states, that no armed ship of 
Persia was to be seen westward of the Chelidonian 
islands, or the entrance of the Euxine, and that no Per- 
sian troops dared to shew themselves within a day’s 
journey of the Grecian seas, But the ambitious views, 
and political jealousies, which arose among the confe- 
derated states of Greece during the prosecution of these 
successful operations, prepared greater evils for their 
country than all that they had endured, while strug- 
ling under the pressure of the Persian hosts. The 
Athenians, though apparently the greatest sufferers by 
the invasion, derived the greatest benefits from its ef 
fects. They found their country laid waste, and their 
city in ruins ; but, in consequence chiefly of their naval 
superiority, and a succession of great commanders, they 
rapidly attained that supremacy in Greece, which the 
Lacedemonians had hitherto enjoyed; and by the able 
conduct of Cimon, the most distinguished of all their 
leaders, soon reached the summit of their political in- 
fluence and military power. The Lacedemonians had 
not been inattentive observers or inactive opponents of 
the growing consequence of the rival state ; but, usually 
slow in their counsels, (and weakened by an earthquake 
which laid their capital in ruins, and by a consequent 
insurrection of the Helots, which reduced them to the 
necessity of requiring aid from their neighbours,) had 
long evaded an open rupture with the Athenian repub- 
lic. The latter people, however, accustomed to war, 
elated with success, swayed by a turbulent democracy, 
and unable longer to disguise their ambitious designs 
upon the liberties of Greece, not satisfied with repeated 
interferences and aggressions against the ancient allies 
of Lacedemon, proceeded at length to make a direct and 
unjustifiable attack upon its armies, while returning 
from the protection of Doris, against the inroads of the 
Phocians. Aided by the Argians and Thessalians, they 
met the Lacedemonians and their Peloponnesian allies 
at Tanagra in Beeotia. After a sevére action of two 
days, and great slaughter on both sides, the Athenians 
were compelled to retreat, and the Spartans pursued 
their march without farther obstruction. 
In the view, however, of raising a state without the 
peninsula, to balance the power and curb the ambition 
of Athens, they formed a close alliance with the The- 
bans, and nae 4 seconded their attempt to recover 
that supremacy in Beeotia, which they had been accus- 
tomed to claim before the event of the Persian war. 
But the Athenians under Myronides speedily regained 
the influence which they had lost by their defeat at Ta- 
nagra; and all Beotia, with the exception of Thebes, 
was brought either into their alliance, or under ‘their 
dominion. Burdened at length by the variety of their 
military operations, and even by the extent of their con- 
quests, they were disposed to-enter into negotiations with 
GREECE. © x 
their Peloponnesian adversaries ; and by the good offi- 
‘ces of Cimon, whom they recalled from exile, and who 
had always been greatly esteemed at Lacedemon, a 
truce for five years was concluded between the rival 
powers. But, after the death of that distinguish 
commander, who had uniformly exerted hi to di- 
vert the military spirit of the Greeks from internal wars, 
hostilities were again renewed. The Athenians, how- 
ever, being hard pressed, and even invaded by the Pe- 
loponnesian confederates, as well as encumbered by the 
numerous islands and colonies subject to their empire, 
a second time sought an accommodation; anda truce 
was concluded tor the space of thirty years, upon terms 
by no means advantageous to their influence. 
constitution of Greece, composed of so many small and 
independent states, was unfavourable to a long conti- 
nuance of general tranquillity. Its nts were Circu 
so distinct, that no common authority could prevent ces u 
the occurrence of partial wars; and yet so connected, vour 
that war in any part always endangered the peace of ¢ 
the whole. This was more especially the ch, 
of a practice, which had become universal among the 
weaker states, to provide for their protection by court- 
ing the alliance, or rather ripe ama the dominion 
of one of the two leading republics of Lacedemon or 
Athens. These two rival powers also differed consider- 
ably in the political principles which they i 
favoured, the former being generally the patroness of 
aristocracy, and the latter of democracy. their 
influence-was extended according as one or other of 
these opposite factions prevailed in the different states ; 
or rather, according as their arms were severally crown- 
ed with success, the party to which they were friendly 
gained the ascendency, and succeeded in bringing the 
state which it ruled to the side of Sparta or of Ai 
This constant rivalship, never wholly ‘dormant, and 
kept in continual excitement by the frequent quarrels 
of the minor commonwealths, at length gave rise tothe __ 
long and bloody contest of the Peloponnesian war. _ 
The Athenians, having assisted the Corcyreans against Oyjgin 
the Corinthians, were — ae by ey the Pel 
le, jommed by maity other complainants, aving ponn 
re the aa ae f insulted the Peloponnesian Aa 
federacy. An assembly of deputies from the different 
states, of which that confederacy was composed, having 
met at Sparta, a great majority decided for an imme- 
diate recourse to arms ; and even the historian Thucy- 
dides admits, in the most explicit terms, that a general 
sentiment of indignation had been excited among a 
large portion of the Grecian people, by the arbitrary and 
oppressive sway of the Athenian republic. See Aris- 
TIDES, &c. “ bs 
The two hostile confederacies, though very different. State o 
ly composed, divided between them ‘very equally the on™ 
force of the Greek nation. All the Peloponnesian § 
states, except the Argians, who remained neutral, join- 
ed the Lacedemonians. In Northern Greece, the Me-~ 
garians, Boeotians, Locrians, Phocians, &e. formed a 
part of ‘the same alliance ; and external assistance was 
expected from the king of Persia, and the Grecian co- 
lonies of Italy and Sicily. The Athenians had few 
allies, and some of them not very zealously inclined to 
their cause. The principal were the Thessalians, and — 
Acarnanians, and the islands of Corcyra, Zacinthus, 
Chios, and Lesbos. But all the other islands of the 
ZEgean Sea, except Melos and Thera, and all the wealthy 
Grecian cities of Thrace, of the Hellespont, and of Asia 
Minor, were'tributary subjects of Athens, -and entirely 
subject toits contd: The Spartan king Archidamus, 
But the p, mn 
war, 
