630 vA 
Hannibal. Alps inthe beginning of winter in the space of 15 
—\~~ days, and appeared in the vicinity of Turin after a 
march ‘ef 1000 miles from New Carthage, accomplished 
in five montlis and a half. His army was now redu- 
ced to 20,000 foot, (of which 12,006 were Africans, 
and the rest Spaniards), and about 6000 cavalry. Ha- 
ving taken in three days the city of the Taurini, and 
put all who opposed him to the sword, he hastened for- 
ward to meet the Consul Publius Scipio, who had 
returned. with the utmost expedition from the banks 
of the Rhone, ‘and had already passed the river Po with 
his army. ‘The two armies joined battle on the banks 
of the Ticinus, a small river in Lombardy ; and Han- 
nibal, chiefly by the superiority of his cavalry, gained 
an easy victory over a general who was neither defi- 
cient in courage or experience, but who seems to have 
been little aware of the talents of his adversary. The 
other Consul Sempronius, having arrived with a fresh 
army, acted with still greater rashness, and, engaging 
the Carthaginians near the river Trebia, sustained a 
much more decisive defeat. In the following campaign 
Hannibal was again fortunate in having to contend 
with a self-confident commander, Caius Flaminius; 
and, having carefully studied his temper, drew him in- 
to a defile by pretending a retreat, and cut to pieces, 
near the Lake Thrasymenus, the greater part of his 
army. But all his talents and expedients were brought 
-into requisition by the dictator Fabius Maximus, who 
justly concluded, that to stop the progress of an inva- 
der is to gain a victory, and who cautiously directed; 
his operations to preserve a commanding position, and 
to intercept’ the foragers of the enemy... The Cartha- 
ginian leader, baffled in all his artful movements to sur- 
prise his opponent, or to force an engagement, resolved 
at least to attach the neighbouring nations to his inte- 
rests, by proving himself master of all the open coun- 
try, boldly directed his march to the fruitful plains of 
Campania, which he quietly ravaged within sight of 
the Roman army. Upon attempting to return with his 
booty through the same pass by which he entered the 
country, he-found himself, when encamped at the foot 
of Mount Callicula, hemmed in by the masterly move-. 
ments of the Dictator ; but by dispersing, during the 
night; 2000 oxen with burning faggots on their horns, 
he contrived to draw off the detachment which occu- 
pied the heights in the Jine of his march, and to bring 
off his army in complete safety. By taking care, in the 
general devastation, to spare the lands of Fabius, he 
encouraged the accusations and suspicions, which were 
ungenerously cast upon that general, of holding a se- 
cret correspondence with the enemy. In. a short time 
he found means to draw into a snare the one half of 
the Roman army, commanded by Minucius, who had 
been raised to equal authority with the Dictator ; but, 
when in’ full, pursuit of the routed legions, he »was 
checked by the advance of Fabius, and obliged .to 
sound a retreat, While. reluctantly retiring to his 
pe he is reported to have said to his attendants, 
“Have I not-often told you,-that that cloud which ho- 
vered upon the mountains, would one day burst upon 
us ina storm?” The Roman generals, enjoined by 
the senate to follow..the plans of Fabius, continuing 
merely to watch the motions of the Carthaginians with- 
out risking a decisive jengagement, he found his diffi- 
culties fearfully accumulating. Without) any hope of 
succours from Carthage, and left'to'the resources of his 
own genius for the means of subsisting his troops, in 
perpetual distrust of his allies in Italy, and daily assail- 
‘ed by the murmurs.of his exhausted soldiers, he was 
HANNIBAL. AAR 
on the point of sacrificing one part of his army to save Ha 
the other, when the rashness of his adversaries agai: 
afforded him not only a season of respite, but an occa. 
sion of triumph. Having understood the at of 
Terentius Varro, one of the new consuls, (who, held the 
command of the Roman army, and who bore with the 
utmost impatience, the cautious counsels of Paulus Emi-_ 
lius, his coll 
ments, insulted him even in his camp, and succeeded 
at length in drawing him into the field, near the fatal 
village of Cann. The Roman army consisted of. 
e), he attacked him in all /his'detach- | . 
80,000 foot, and 6000.horse, and’that of Hannibal — 
amounted only to 50,000 in. 
of which 10,000 were 
cavalry. Varro, on the ;day"of his turn. to command, _ 
impatient to punish, as. he ex it, the insolence 
of the Carthaginian, ‘and. con 
his troops, descended into level ground, as if he had 
studied to favour the enemy’s superiority in ¢ Ls 
and inva battle, which has already been described in 
work, (see Cann), lost nearly the whole of the lar« 
gest army which had ever been equipped by Rome, while 
the loss of Hannibal did not exceed 6000 men. “ Follow 
me,” said one of the Carthaginian officers, elated with the 
annihilation: of the Roman army ; “I will be at Rome 
with the cayalry before they.have notice of my. ap- 
ch. In five days we.shall sup in the Capitol.” 
Mo the refusal of Hannibal to adopt this advice, the 
preservation of Rome and its empire has been ascribed 
by Livy, and several other ancient historians ; but mas _ 
ny later writers have. questioned the justice of the cen- 
sure. |Rome had been carefully fortified after the bat- 
tle of Thrasymenus, and was provided with every Kine 
necessary to sustain a siege. It was full of 
well trained to war, and supplied the dictator Junius. 
Pera with four new legions and 100 horse, ‘immediate- 
ly after the aelly Sentins Maanbels advantages 
had been principally gained by. his: superiority in ca- 
, which could be of little use in attacking a city ; 
and the rest of his army did not exceed 35,000 men, 
« His own judgment,” says Dr Adam Fergusson, “ is 
of more weight than that of the persons who censure 
him; He knew the character of the Romans, and his 
own strength. Though victorious, he was greatly 
weakened by his victories, and at a distance from the 
means of a reinforcement or supply. He was unpro- 
vided with engines of attack ; and so far from bein 
ina condition to venture on the siege of Rome, that 
he could net attack even Naples, which,. after the bat« 
tle of Canne, refused to open its gates.” 
Hannibal, soon after his victory at Cann, withdrew 
his army to Capua, the pence city of Campania, 
where he finally took up his winter quarters, after se- 
veral unsuccessful attonapte to gain possession of Nola, 
Casilinum, and_ particularly ‘ 
ies; to 25,000 men ; and the want 
of supplies from which had indeed been pro- 
mised, but were slow 1 their ane was - fe 
al cause of his power declining in Italy. He had no 
poe to pare Roman armies, which were so ra- 
pidly collected against him, and, at the same time, to 
garrison the towns and protect the countries which had 
ing in the number of - 
