702 



B R I T A I N. 



Iiritl'.ill. 



principle, yet the open manner is wholly respectable. 

 In this eloquent passage, Mr Windham do.es not dis- 

 tract us with detail ; he troubles us with no cant, no 

 declamation, no evasion. He meets us on the ground 

 Ex:imiii.i. f principle, unlike in every respect totho e half con- 

 tion o: Mr ceding temporizing amenders, who frittered and par- 

 Vindham's ed away the bill of Mr Curwen, till it became, what 

 '"" a member in the house, with most rational ridicule, 

 proposed to call it, " An act for the better securing 

 the power of the crown in the Commons House of 

 Parliament, by vesting in the lords commissioners of 

 his majesty's treasury the monopoly of scats in the 

 said house." Of Mr Windham's arguments, it may 

 be fairly said, that they prove too much. If the in- 

 fluence of property be the fair source of representa- 

 tion, what a paradox and contradiction is our consti- 

 tution, which retains even obsolete laws against bri- 

 bery ? It such a principle be adopted, what security 

 shall we have if seats in parliament should be adver- 

 ti/ed in the papers for sale ; if auction rooms were 

 established for every office in the state ? The argu- 

 ment of Mr Windham, if admitted, would prove, 

 that no enactments, no safeguards against bribery, 

 are to be admitted. The case may be argued on two 

 grounds, principle and effect, theory and practice. 

 Now, every thing that can be called principle in the 

 constitution, every feeling-that can be called principle 

 in the human mind, the law itself is at variance with 

 direct bribery to the individual voter. But it is cer- 

 tainly the drift of Mr Windham's argument, bu 

 indirect, that bribery, when couched under the in- 

 fluence of property, can ne'ther be wholly detected 

 nor punished, without incurring greater evils than 

 those which are proposed to be remedied, and that no 

 attempt to remedy the evil should be made. It is a 

 sufficient answer to this, that the most perfect system 

 of representation, must tolerate a degree of indirect 

 bribery, because it cannot interfere with actions that 

 are not tangible or direct. The law cannot reach to 

 tacit understandings between the landlord and his 

 farmer, however probable it may be that the vote of 

 the latter at an election is influenced by their mutual 

 relation. But the law does not sanction this under- 

 standing ; it only abstains from prosecuting what it 

 cannot affect to remedy. But this does not prove 

 that it should not interpose when cases are flagrant, 

 when they overtop suspicion, and rise to clear proof. 

 In cases of paternal authority, the law docs not pre- 

 tend to remedy many evils which arise from its exer- 

 tion. There may be harsh fathers, and miserable 

 children, whose cases can never come within its reach ; 

 but when the cruelty rises to a certain pitch, th 

 abuse of that authority, like the abuse of the influence 

 of property, is justly amenable to trial and punish- 

 ment. The argument of Mr Windham is then a 

 mere sophism, setting out on the assumption, that the 

 principle which is to guide us in practical politics, is 

 not that thing which distinguishes actions, but which 

 assimilates them. This is metaphysical quibbling on 

 the word principle. There is much utility to be 

 sure, for the purpose of legal arrangement, in classing 

 actions by their features of similarity ; but when ac- 

 tions are to be punished or prevented, distinctions 

 are sacredly necessary. In apportioning the punish- 

 ment due to bloodshed itself, the law makes distinc- 



between nmrder and manslaughter, which, ac- Britain. 



cording to Mr Windham's reasoning^ could never np- 



ply. The line of distinction, it is true, ' ""'" " 



1809. 



lawful and unlawful influence of property, c::n i ; o 

 more be drawn with infallible certainty, than t : 

 of distinction between the lawful and unlawful use of 

 the right of self defence, or bctn.rn murder and 

 manslaughter. The influence of property will always 

 operate at elections in three ways. By the reapecta- 

 bility which property gives to the richer Candida*:. 

 That may be an innocent and even wholesome in- 

 fluence. It will operate also by the dependence ol 

 many of the voters for their wages or custom on the 

 candidate or his friends. But this argument against 

 reform is more formidable in appearance than in re- 

 ality. If the laws against influence of this latter kind 

 were enforced with vigilance in cases of notorious and 

 open exertions, the candidate would be taught cau- 

 tion in holding out either threats or promises to vo- 

 ters ; and the great mass of that part of society, 

 whom a moderate reform would introduce as voters, 

 are, in the present times, by no means so dependent 

 on landlords or gn?at masters of manufactures, as the 

 enemies of reform hold out. 



The practical evils resulting from the present Evils of 

 system of representation are, 1st, That certain bo- present 

 roughs are entirely, necessarily, and perpetually at the s!ate of 

 Mil of i rtain families, so as to be considered as j reSel 

 a part of their rightful property ; and, 2d, That cer- 

 tain other boroughs are held and managed by corrupt 

 agents and jobbers, for the express purpose of being 

 sold for a price in ready money, either through the 

 intervention of the treasury, or directly to the candi- 

 date. The latter use is certainly the great and cry- 

 ing evil. The boroughs, containing a few hundred 

 voters, are so notoriously venal, as to have received 

 the name of rotten and sometimes ircamri/ bo- 

 roughs, though the opposition and individuals 

 sometimes buy them. The agent, who is generally an 

 attorney settled in the place, obtains a complete local 

 knowledge of the circumstances of the electors, and 

 of the bribes, whether pecuniary, or in the shape of 

 providing situations for the relations of such electors 

 as are best calculated to secure a majority for any 

 member whom it may be his interest to get appoint- 

 ed. He receives from the minister a sum of perhaps 

 several thousand pounds, to secure the nomination of 

 the intended member. The minister gets the sum 

 from the candidate, which goes in the first instance 

 to the procurer of the scat, and a part of it is by 

 him spent in direct bribery, and other expences of 

 election, and the surplus retained as the procurer's 

 reward. Those electors who do not receive a bribe 

 in money, are promised little offices for themselves or 

 relatives in the excise, church, army, or navy. The 

 ministers thus obtain a seat for their own creature ; 

 the electors gain either cash or provisionary benefits ; 

 the constitution and the country are the only suf- 

 ferers. Against the remedying of such abuses, the 

 cry of innovation has been raised. The truth is, 

 that these traffickings are amongst the most recent 

 innovations of the constitution. The transference of 

 the right of election from such places as have a few, 

 and consequently a more corruptible body of elec- 

 tors, would only bring back the representation to 





