BRITAIN. 



ral Victor ; whose army, thus strengthened to the 

 1 number of 35,000, took its station along the Al- 

 berchc, and in tiie neighbourhood of Talavcra. His 

 design was to oppose the march of the united Spa- 

 nish and British armies againt Madrid ; for Sir Ar- 

 thur Wellesley, after returning from the pursuit of 

 Soult, judged it expedient to direct his force against 

 Victor, and for this purpose determined to co-ope- 

 rate with Cuesta. 



On the '20th of July, a complete junction of the 

 allies had taken place ; and relying on the auxiliary 

 movements of Sir Robert Wilson, (who, with a well- 

 disciplined Portuguese corps, was ordered to Esca- 

 lona,) and the division of Venegas, which advanced 

 to Argonda, the grand army proceeded to Talavera, 

 where the right of the enemy's outposts was driven 

 in. On the 24th, the corps of Victor fell back 

 from the Alberche, and formed a junction with the 

 army of Sebastian!. The French having at last 

 combined all their forces, including the garrison of 

 Madrid, the guards of King Joseph, and the corps of 

 Sebastiani, Victor, and Jourdan, first repulsed Cuesta, 

 who had attempted to pursue them. 



The Spanish general fell back, after his repulse, 

 upon the British army ; and the allies, determin- 

 ing to await the attack of the enemy, stood in a 

 strong position at Talavera. Their united num- 

 bers amounted to 64,000 men, of which 26,000 

 were British. On the 27th of July, the French, 

 45,000 strong, advanced to a general action, in 

 which they attempted every quarter of the allied ar- 

 my without success. Being completely repulsed, 

 they retreated across the Alberche, with the loss 

 of 20 pieces of cannon, and, according to our cal- 

 culation, of 10,000 men. The loss of the British, 

 on whom the stress of the action fell, was not less 

 than 6000. The Spaniards, who fought bravely, 

 though they were less engaged, had about 1000 kil- 

 led and wounded. Abundant triumph has been made 

 over this victory. We confess it appears to us a 

 less remarkable achievement than the other victo- 

 ries of Lord Wellington, that 64,000 men should, 

 upon a strong position, repulse 45,000. It has been 

 said that the Spanish troops were undisciplined, and 

 contributed little to the victory. This fact we de- 

 ny ; for the army of Cuesta was the best disciplined 

 of the Spanish troops. The Spaniards covered the 

 right wing ; and it was by their aid that General 

 Campbell's brigade, which occupied a commanding 

 position in the centre of the armies, was enabled 

 to hold its position, and to capture the enemy's ar- 

 tillery. That the Spaniards were less engaged than 

 the British is certain ; but their usefulness in the en- 

 gagement certainly brought the force of our army 

 to a fair equality with the enemy, if not to such a 

 superiority on our side as might be reasonably ex- 

 pected to produce a victory. 



But the allies had scarcely time to congratulate 

 themselves on the victory, when it was found that 

 the situation was dangerous and untenable. Soult, 

 Ney, and Mortier, having formed ajunction, had ad- 

 vanced through Estremadura, and got over in the 

 rear of the British ; while Victor, though defeated, 

 had still 30,000 men. Leaving Cuesta to defend 

 Talavera, and to take care of the British wounded, 



709 



Sir Arthur Wcllctley marched, on the 3d of August, Bnuw. 

 to Ovopesa, in the direction in which Soult \va, ad- ' -y~"-^ 

 vancing. On the evening of the same day, howevei , 

 he was informed thatCu ' to leave Talavcra 



immediately, dreading that the I'ritibh would be un- 

 able to oppose the united number* of Soult, Ncy, 

 and Mortier. The hospital of the British wounded, 

 which the English General had entrusted to him, 

 Cuesta was obliged to abandon to the French. 



From this perilous situation, Sir Arthur Wdlesley 

 retreated as fast as possible by Deleytosa to Jaraicejo, 

 where he remained for some time with his advanced 

 posts, on the Tagus, unmolested. But his distress 

 for want of provisions, and the means of transport, 

 which he had incessantly and in vain represented to 

 the Spanish government, still continuing to intreaK, 

 he found it necessary to retreat to Badajos, on the 

 frontiers of Portugal. Here, during the remainder 

 of the year, his army remained, not only inactive, but 

 exposed, from the unhealthiness of the situation, to 

 the ravages of a very fatal disorder. 



Gerona, the key of Catalonia, had maintained, as Siege at 

 we have already mentioned, a noble and protracted Gerona. 

 resistance. Almost the only strong part of it was 

 the castle of Montjoi, but even after this had been 

 reduced to a heap of ruins, the city still stood. By 

 a dexterous and bold manoeuvre of General Blake's, 

 a relief of provisions and ammunition was thrown into 

 the place, and its garrison raised to the effective 

 strength of 3000 men. The French generals, St 

 Cyr and Verdicr, after having made four ineffectual 

 assaults, were recalled by Bonaparte, from their com- 

 mand, and the siege was entrusted to Augerau, whose 

 unwearied activity and superior numbers, at last suc- 

 ceeded in driving off the covering army of Blake, 

 and taking Gerona by storm, atter its walls were 

 beaten down, and the strength, though not the spirit 

 of its inhabitants, had been reduced by famine. Be- 

 sides the fugitive army of Blake, the Spaniards still 

 maintained, in the begining of November, a central 

 army under Cuesta and the Duke D'Albuquerque, 

 and an army on the left under the Duke del Parque. 

 The latter commander being posted at Zamanes, 

 about six leagues to the south of Salamanca, obtained Reverses ol 

 a brilliant victory over a considerable French army, the Spanish 

 lately commanded by Ncy, but now under General 

 Marchaiid. But advancing to Salamanca, he was 

 defeated at Alba del Tormes, with immense loss. A 

 similar fate befel the army of La Mancha under 

 General Areisaja, which, attempting to penetrate to 

 Madrid, was attacked at Ocana, and routed with the 

 loss of 40,000 muskets and all its artillery. Thus, 

 at the close of 1809, (a year never more perhaps to 

 be paralleled in Europe for an opportunity of union 

 against its common enemy), Spain witnessed the 

 successive dispersion and defeat of her principal armies. 

 Her supreme Junta still edited addresses full of pom- 

 pous language, and confident expectations ; while 

 their measures were for every practical purpose, either 

 torpid or mischievous. Two circumstai.ces indeed 

 took place, from which a change in the character of 

 their measures was expected, the admission of the 

 Marquis Romana into that body, and the arrival of 

 the Marquis Wellesley as ambassador from Great 

 Britain. But neither of these characters were able 



