KANT. 



42J 



Kant- trived to gain the ear of the public, and to throw the 

 - - arguments of their opponent into the shade of unpopu- 

 larity and neglect. The lightness and plausibility of 

 the empirical philosophy, indeed, could not fail to 

 give it a decided advantage over the more abstruse 

 and more rigorous philosophy of the schools. The 

 oracles of the former, experience and common sense, 

 were much more accessible to the multitude; proba- 

 bility, instead of strict demonstration, was more easily 

 supplied ; and all disputes were soon disposed of, or 

 thrown aside as mere verbal controversies. The arbi- 

 trary language, which this philosophy introduced, 

 rendered it easy for many to become the inventors of 

 theories ; and the analogical reasoning which it adopt- 

 ed, drew all arts and sciences within its sphere, and 

 gave it a specious, though false appearance of universal 

 application. 



In the meantime, the science of metaphysics, once 

 held in honourable estimation, and dignified with the 

 proud title of Queen of the Arts, was repudiated and 

 deserted, treated with scorn or neglect, and led to 

 complain like Hecuba : 



itoia muimf rtnm, 

 Tot generit no/up* fotau, 

 .V Hfktr txnl faxyt. OVIP. 



This science, indeed, might have been irretrievably 

 lost, and entirely superseded by the airy speculations 

 of popular theorists; had not a philosopher arisen, 

 endowed with an extraordinary power of intense re- 

 flection, a spirit of profound and patient investigation, 

 and a metaphysical acutene** and perspicuity in the 

 discovery and developemeut of abstract truths, of 

 which toe world hi* Men no lamplf since the days 

 of Aristotle ; a man who, to great natural talent*, 

 added the most 'various and extensive acquired know- 

 ledge. " Our age," says Gaive, himself no mean 

 philosopher, " has witnessed the labours of one of the 

 most indefatigable philosophers, who hare at any pe- 

 riod cultivated the territory of the sciences. Whatever 

 opiaion we may entertain of the results of the Kantian 

 system, as tending to enlarge or set bounds to human 

 knowledge, it is impossible for us to withhold from its 

 author that high respect which is due to the unwearied 

 application of superior powers of thought, and those 

 thanks which we owe him for such an exercise of those 

 powers as comprehend* the whole field of philosophy." 

 (MiMyi, vol.ii.) Kant thought he perceived those 

 defect*, which had brought metaphysical speculations 

 into disgrace ; and he devoted the labour of a whole 

 life to a total reform and re-establishment of his fa- 

 vourite science. The diificultie* attending such a 

 task, however, wen many and obvious. From a sys- 

 tem of doctrine*, which had given way upon the first 

 rude shock of scepticism, be could expect little irt 

 ance or support. It was necessary to begin' the pro- 

 otM of meditation tie novo ; to subject the cognitive 

 facility to a new critical analysis ; to determine the na- 

 ture and conditions, the objects and extent of its cxer 

 ease ; and to fix the precise limits of its legitimate pro- 

 In several of his works, he has given us very 



interesting hinta on the motives which induced him to 

 undertake this laborious task, and on the principle* by 

 which he was guided daring the progress of his inves- 

 tigation*. The sceptical objection* of Hume first 

 d him from his dogmatical slumber, and gave a 

 dimlion to his inquiries in the field of specula- 



tive philosophy. He was far from assenting to the Kant 

 conclusions which Hume drew from his premises, S ""Y" < 

 which ap|>eared to him to result from a too limited 

 view of the subject in question. Had Hume enlarged 

 his views, and exhibited the problem, of which his ob- 

 jections embrace only a part, in its whole extent and 

 bearings ; had these objections, in short, comprehend- 

 ed, as they ought to have done, the whole of meta- 

 physical science, it seems to be the opinion of Kant, 

 that he would most probably have been led, by his 

 natural sagacity, to the discovery of principles similar 

 to those which are developed in the critical philoso- 

 phy. 



Kant was now led to investigate the causes of the 

 different fate which had hitherto attended the science 

 of metaphysics, when compared with the successful 

 result of the inquiries of philosophers in other depart- 

 ments of science The principles of logic, he observed, 

 had been incontrovertibly established, and the science 

 completed, as early as the days of Aristotle. This ad- 

 vantage, he ascribes, in a great degree, to the narrow 

 limits of this science : Logic having nothing to do 

 with objects and their differences, but being solely oc- 

 cupied with the abstract forms peculiar to the under- 

 standing. The* science of mathematics had likewise 

 been cultivated with success from the earliest time*. 

 1'iiy -ical science was much more slow in its progress 

 towards systematic principles. Metaphysical science, 

 a science of speculative reason quite isolated, which 

 soar* beyond experience, and is conversant in the re- 

 gion of ideas, this science, in which reason is her 

 own disciple, has not hitherto been so fortunate as 

 to have acquired the possession of any systematic prin- 

 ciple*, which are recognized as of general application. 

 On the contrary, its field has been, as it were, the are- 

 na, on which various champions have exercised their 

 prowess, but where no triumph has been gained, which 

 was attended with any permanent advantage. How 

 ha* it happened, that no sarc footing has yet been found 

 for this science? And by what hint can we profit, in 

 order to institute an investigation, with the prospect of 

 better success than that which has attended the efforts 

 of our predecessors ? The remarkable revolutions which 

 were accomplished in mathematics and natural philoso- 

 phy, afford us examples worthy of imitation, in so far 

 a* their analogy with metaphysical science will permit. 

 Hitherto, it has been generally held, that all our ideas 

 must be accommodated to the objects of our experience ; 

 but all attempts to extend our knowledge a priori, upon 

 this supposition, have proved entirely abortive. Let 

 us try, therefore, says Kant, whether we shall not suc- 

 ceed better in our efforts to solve the problem" of me- 

 taphysics, by assuming, ccontrario, that the objects are 

 accommodated to the nature of our cognitive faculty ; 

 a supposition which accords much better with the pos- 

 sibility of our possessing any ideas a priori, i. e. before 

 Use objects are given. This method is similar to that 

 of Copernicus ; who, when he found that he could not 

 explain the motions of the heavenly bodice upon the 

 old hypothesis that the stars revolved round thespeo- 

 tator tried whether he could not succeed better, by 

 awutninc, that the spectator revolved, and that the stars 

 remained at rest. 



Such was the preliminary train of thought, which 

 Mggested to the mind of Kant the elements of that 

 system, which he afterwards developed in his great 

 work, the Criiit der rcinen ycrnunft ; a work whii-h. 

 whatever may be the ultimate fate of the theory it in- 



